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Tlte habit of considering m i s m  as a mental quirk, as a psychological flaw, 
must be abandoned. 
Frantz Fanon 
We cannot defeat m e  prejudice by proving that is wrong. The reason for this 
is that race prqjudice is only a symptom of a materialistic social fact ... The 
articulate white man$ ideas about his racial supen'orib are rooted deeply in 
the social system, and it can be corrected only by changing the system itself. 
Oliver Cromwell Cox 
Race and m i s m  are not figments of demented imaginations, but are central to 
the economics, politics, and culture of this nation. 
Robert Blauner 
I. Introduction 
The area of race and ethnic studies, unlike those of class and gender studies, lacks a sound 
theoretical apparatus. Whereas class and gender analysts have capitalism and patriarchy as  
theoretical constructs upon which to ground their analyses, analysts of race and ethnicity do not 
have a theoretical equivalent. Instead the two major approaches to the field --the natural and the 
structural-- have developed the slippery notion of "racism" as the central category for explaining 
racial and ethnic conflict. Those who believe that  racism is the "natural" outcome of racial or 
cultural contacts among different peoples (e.g., early work by Robert E. Park, Ruth ~ienedict, and 
Winthrop Jordan) have a very limited theory. In their view, races and ethnic groups are made up 
of the in-groups and out-groups in a society and racism and ethncocentrism are the ideas used by 
in-groups to rationalize their dominant position. In their works they emphasize how these ideas 
developed and evolved throughout history, affecting the s ta tus  of the out-groups. Those who 
believe that  racism is "structural" (e.g., later work of Park, Franklin Frazier, Oliver Cox, van den 
Berghe, Edna Bonacich, and William Julius Wilson) regard race relations as secondary social 
phenomena. By this I mean that they deem "race" as a secondary rather than a primary category 
of group association. Race is seen as  a "social construct" and racism (or ethnocentrism) as an 
ideology used by powerful social actors ("whites," the bourgeoisie, the colonizers, etc.) to exploit 
minority groups. In their works they explore how this ideology (defined as a set of ideas) has 
reflected and affected conflict rooted in the social structure. Both approaches, despite their 
differences, share the following: they do not regard racial phenomena a s  having their own 
independent structure. 
To complicate matters, many analysts of racial matters have abandoned the serious 
theorization and reconceptualization of their central category: racism! l Too many social analysts 
researching racism assume that the phenomenon is self-evident and, accordingly, either do not 
provide a definition or else provide a very elementary definition of it (e.g., Schuman, Steeh, and 
- Bobo 1985: Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Nevertheless, whether implicit or explicit, most analysts 
regard racism as an ideblogical phenomenon. Racism is viewed as  a set of beliefs, ideas, attitudes, 
stereotypes, or motives, held by individuals, whichsafTect the life chances of.racial minorities. 
Although, as I will show in the paper, alternative views on what is racism and how it. operates in 
society have emerged, they still are heavily influenced by the ideological conceptualization of the 
phenomenon and do not provide a truly structural interpretation of it. 
The purpose of this paper is to point out the severe limitations of most contemporary 
frameworks employed in the analysis of racial issues and to suggest an alternative structural 
theorization. Rather than viewing racism as  a mere idea, belief or attitude, I contend that racism 
is the ideological apparatus of a mial i zed  social system. This means that racial phenomena in any 
society have their own structure. I argue that the racism operates within the boundaries of social 
relations of subordination and superordination among racialized social actors (races). In other 
words, the existence of racism indicates the existence of a racial structure in society. I contend the 
after societies experienced racialization --social creation of racial categories-- race became an 
For very notable exceptions, see Omi and Winant (1986), the excellent collection edited by Rex 
and Mason (1986), and Essed (1991). 
independent category of group association with meaningful consequences for all the races in the 
social system.2 
This theoretical postulate requires that analysts of racism take seriously the variable race, 
something that has declined in many academic circles since the late 1970s (e.g., Wilson 1978, 
1987).3 Moreover, this structural interpretation of race and racism compels analysts to have a 
compamtive stand across time and social formations to disclose the particular dynamics of 
racialized social systems. Nonetheless, arguing for the centrality of the category race and for the 
fundamental role played by racism in society does not imply that other structural components of 
social systems (e.g., capitalism and patriarchy) and their central categories (class and gender) are 
. _- secondary. Instead, I maintain that racialization originated out of the labor needs of European . - 
gfq.%v&, powers in the 15th century (Cox 1948; Williams 1990), and that since then, race has been .-.* ,.- 
. - - t - articulated with class and gender in a "complex unity" (Hall 1980). Class, gender, and race are % c4.e. 
G;? 
viewed as elements of the systemic matrix of the social system that. in the last instance, 
&>&; articulates the interest of the dominant race~class /~ender .~  Yet the paper focuses almost 
exclusively on the analysis of the racialized aspects of social systems because the structural 
is -. 
nature and centrality of race and race relations has not been properly theorized. 
The organization of this inquiry is straightforward. In the second section I discuss the 
predominant view of racism in the social sciences and provide a review of its limitations. This is 
followed by a. succinct critical review of some of the most prominent radical alternative views on 
For recent examples of the opposite view, see Barbara J. Fields, "Slavery, Race and Ideology in 
the United States," the New Left Review 181 (MayIJune 1990) and Yehudi Webster, The 
Racialization of America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). 
3 This is not a new argument. A substantial number of social analysts have preached the melody 
of the "declining significance of race" since the 1950s. Among the most notable were Robert E. 
Park (1950), John Milton Yinger (1965), and Pierre van den Berghe (1967). 
There is a growing consensus among radical social scientists about the need to develop an 
integrated analysis of race, class, and gender. But, so far, no major theoretical breakthrough has 
emerged. Some potentially useful conceptions are  Denise Segura's (1990) notion of the "triple 
oppression" and Philomena Essed's (1991) notion of "gendered racism." See also Nancy Fraser, 
Unruly Pmctices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Discourse (Mmneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989). . 
how race and racism operate in society (namely, the Marxist, institutionalist, internal colonialism, 
and racial formation perspectives). In the fourth section I offer an alternative framework for 
analyzing racism. Finally, in the fifth section I provide an  overview of U.S. history through the 
prism of the framework advanced in the paper. 
11. The Dominant View on Racism 
The concept of racism is of recent origin in social scientific discourse (Banton 1970; Miles 
1989, 1993). In the classic works of W. I. Thomas (1918), Edward B. Reuter (1934), Riobert E. 
Park (1950), and E. F. Frazier (1968), the concept was not employed a t  all. Anthropologist Ruth 
F. Benedict has the distinction of being one of the first scholars to use the notion in her 1942 book 
Race and Racism. She defined racism as  "the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature 
to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority .... It  is, like a 
religion, a belief which can be studied only historically" (Benedict 1959: 87). Despite some 
refinements the current usage of the concept of racism in the social sciences is very similar to that 
of Benedict. In the words of renowned scholar Pierre van den Berghe, racism is "any set of beliefi 
that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human 
groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant 
abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious 
distinctions between groups socially defined as races" (van den Berghe 1967: 11; my emphasis). 
Richard T. Schaefer provides a more concise definition of racism: "a doctrine of racial supremacy, 
that one race is superior" (Schaefer 1990: 16). 
An apparently different view is that of William Julius Wilson who defined racism in his 
theoretical piece Power, Privilege, and Racism (1972) as an ideology5 of racial domination or 
exploitation that 1) incorporates beliefs about a particular race's cultural and/or inherent biological 
The notion of ideology is used by most social scientists to mean a set of ideas. Later in the paper 
I will characterize racism as  the ideology of a racialized social system but using a Marxist-inspired 
definition of the notion of ideology. 
inferiority and 2) uses those beliefs to justify and prescribe inferior or unequal treatment for that 
group. Similarly, in his The Declining Significance of Race, Wilson defined racism or racial belief 
systems as "the norms or ideologies of racial domination tha t  reinforce or regulate patterns of 
racial inequality1' (RTilson 1978: 9; my emphasis). Despite the inclusion of notions such as racial 
exploitation and racial domination (notions which are  not defined in his work) Wilson does not 
develop a truly autonomous structural interpretation of race relations and conflict. Instead, race 
- . .  . -. 
relations are viewed as dependent upon larger societal changes, "often beyond the interracial 
arena1' such as industrialization, urbanization, immigration, revolutions, or civil wars 
1972: 61). Thus "racial ideologies" change because of structural changes tha t  are not "racial" in 
and of t_hemselves. In his own words: -- - - 
... as -4merican racial histol-y so clearly reveals, racial norms tend to change as 
?--x>z 
the structural relations between racial groups change. And the main sources of 
2: 7mT- 
this variation have been the alteration of the system of production and changing - . .- policies of the state (Wilson 1978: 12: my emphasis). 
- . -  
--3 . - This idealist view --in the philosophical sense of the word-- still prevails in the social 
E =, sciences.6 Its singular focus on ideas has mostly reduced the study of racism to the field of social 
' . ' 
' psychology. This perspective has produced a schematic view of how racism operates in society (see 
F i p r e  1 below). First: authors subscribing to this idealist view define racism, in classical fashion, 
as a set of ideas or beliefs. Second, those beliefs are regarded a s  having the potential to lead 
individuals to develop prejudice, which is defined as  "negative attitudes towards an entire group of 
people" (Schaefer 1990: 53). Finally, these prejudiced attitudes a re  regarded as the motor that 
6 The following is a sample of contemporary textbooks in race and ethnic relations that  still 
conceive racism and ethnocentrism in ideological terms. Martin N. Marger, Race and Ethnic 
Relations: American and Global Perspectives (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1994); Joe R. Feagin and Clairece Booher Feagin, Racial and Ethnic Relations (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993); Vincent N. Parrillo, Strangers to the Shores: Race and Ethnic 
Relations in the United States (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994); and Virginia 
Cyrus, Experiencing Race, Class, and Gender in the United States (California: Mayfield Publishing 
Company, 1993). 
may induce individuals to real actions or discrimination against racial minorities7 This conceptual 
framework, with minor modifications, still prevails in the social sciences. 
Figure 1 
Discrimination = Negative Actions Against Members of a"RaceW 
'r - .  
Prejudice = Negative Attitudes Towards a "RaceW(s) 
t 
1 
Racism = Negative Ideas About a "RaceWis) 
There are several limitations of this idealist conception of racism: 
1) Racism is exclrided from the foundations or structr~re o f  the social system. By regarding 
racism as a baseless ideology ultimately dependent upon other "real" forces in society, the 
structure of the society itself is not classified as  racist. ~ l t h o u ~ h  some analysts-have a t t empted .~  
tackle the question of the historical origin of the phenomenon 1944; Cox 1948; van den 
Berghe 1967; Rex 1983), they have explained its reproduction or maintenance in an idealist 
fashion; racism, in their accounts, i s  viewed as an ideology that  emerged with chattel slavery and 
other forms of classlrace oppression to justify the exploitation of people of color and has survived 
as  residue from the past. 
2 )  Racism is ultimately viewed as a psychological phenomenon to be analyzed at the 
individual level. Accordingly, the research agenda that follows from this conceptualization is the 
auscultation of the attitudes of individuals to determine the levels of racism in society (Schuman, 
Steeh, and Bobo 1985; Sears 1988; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Given that the constructs used 
to measure racism are static, that is, that there are a number of standard questions that do not 
change significantly over time, this research usually finds that  racism is declining in society. 
The classic statement on these concepts and their relationships is still  ord don W. Allport, The 
Nature of Prejudice (1958). 
Those analysts who find that racist attitudes are still with us, usually leave unexplained the 
question of why that is so (e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993). 
This psychological understanding of racism is related to the former limitation. If racism is 
not part of societies but is a matter of individuals who are "racist" or "prejudiced," that is, is a 
phenomenon operating a t  the individual level, then, 1) social institutions cannot be racist and 2) 
racism is a matter of surveying the proportion of people in a society who hold "racist" beliefs. 
Thus, institutions can be operated by "racist" individuals or may institutionalize racist beliefs and 
practices (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Chesler 1976), but they cannot be conceptualized a s  
"racist" per se. A good example of this is William Julius Wilson contention in his The Declining 
Significance of Race (1978) that the state in the modern industrial period (post-1940) in the U.S. is 
not "racist." Although Wilson acknowledges that there is still "racism" a t  the social and political 
levels, the state is viewed a s  free of racism (see Frazier 195713: 172-173; c.f. Marable 1981; Omi 
and Winant 19 86). 
3) Racism i s  treated as a static phenomenon. At the historical level this means that analysts 
cannot envision that racism may change in nature over time. Since the phenomenon is viewed as  
unchanging, when a rearticulation of a society's racial structure and its customary racial practices 
occurs, they are characterized a s  declines in racism (Wilson 1978), natural processes in cycles 
(Park 1950), examples of increased assimilation (Rex 1973 1986), or effective "norm changes" 
(Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). 
This limitation, once again, derives from not conceiving racism as  having an independent 
structural foundation. If racism is just a matter, of ideas without any real basis in contemporary 
society, then those ideas should be similar to whatever their original configuration was. The ideas 
may be articulated in a different context but, in essence, most analysts believe that racist ideas are 
the same. That is why, with notable exceptions (e.g., Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988), their 
research is still based on assessing the responses to questions originally developed in the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s. 
4) Analysts defining racism in an idealist manner view racism as "incorrect" or "irmtional 
thinking" and thus label "racists" as irmtional actors (Blauner 1969; Wellman 1977) .~  Since 
racism is conceived of a s  a belief with no real social basis, then it follows that those who hold to 
racist views must be irrational and/or stupid. This view allows for a tactical distinction between 
the individuals with the "pathology" and "rational" racism-free social actors. The problem with 
this rationalistic view is twofold. First, it misses the very rational elements upon which racialized 
systems were originally built. And, more importantly, it neglects the possibility that contemporary 
racism still has a rational foundation. In this account, contemporary racists are perceived as 
Archie Bunker-type individuals (Wellman 19 77). 
On the issue of the psychopathological view of racism, Pierre van den Berghe noted a long 
time ago that: 
... there-is unquestionably a psychopathology of racism, but in racist societies 
most racists are not "sick." ... Racism for some people is a symptom of deeply 
rooted psychological problems, but for most people living in racist societies is 
merely a special kind .of convenient rationalizations for rewarding behavior. If 
this were not true, racial attitudes would not be so rapidly changing a s  they are 
under changing social conditions. The "sociopathology" of m i s m  is thus a 
different problem altogether fiom its psychopathology and one of wider proportions 
(van den Berghe 1967: 21). 
5) Racism is understood as matter of overt behavior. Since this approach likens racism with 
"irrational1' and "rigid" views, it follows that its manifestations should be quite evident and 
usually involve some degree of hostility. This does not present serious analytical problems for the 
study of certain periods in racialized societies where racial practices were quite overt (e.g., slavery 
and Apartheid), but places immense limitations on the analysis of racism in situations where 
racial practices are more subtle, indirect, or fluid. For instance, many analysts have suggested 
that in contemporary America racial practices are manifested in a covert manner (Wellman 1977) 
and racial attitudes are more symbolic (Sears 1988) or subtle (Pettigrew 1994). Therefore, it is a 
This view was epitomized by the work of Adorno and his associates who viewed "ethnocentric" 
people as  holding "rigid" views, "stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding 
ingroups," and a "hierarchical and authoritarian" view of how ethnic groups should interact 
(Adorno et al. 1950: 102-150). 
waste of time to attempt to detect "racism" with questions like "How strongly would you object if 
a member of your family wanted to bring a black friend home to dinner?" or "An occasional 
lynching in the South is a good thing because there is a large percentage of Negroes in many 
communities and they need a scare once in a while to prevent them from starting riots and 
d is t~rbances ."~  (Also, these questions were developed to measure the extent of racist attitudes in 
the population during the Jim Crow period of race relations and are not suitable for the post-1960s 
period.) 
Furthermore, this emphasis on overt behavior limits the possibility of analyzing racial 
phenomena in other parts of the world such as Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico where race relations 
do not have an overt character. lo The form of race relations --overt or covert-- depends upon the - 
pattern of racialization that structured a particular society (Cox 1948; Harris 1964; van den 
Berghe 1 9 6 7  Rex 1983) as  well as  on how the process of racial contestation and other social 
dynamics affected that pattern (see section 3 below). 
6) Contemporary racism is viewed as an expression of the original sin, that is, as a remnant 
of previous m i a l  situations. In the case of the U.S. some analysts argue that racism preceded 
slavery andlor capitalism in the U.S. (Jordan 1968; Marable 1983). Other analysts see racism in 
the U.S. as the result of slavery (Moyniham and Glazer 1970). Even promising new avenues of 
research, like that presented by David Roediger in his The Wages of Whiteness, dismiss 
The first question is used by NORC and the second is from the Total Ethnocentric Scale 
developed by Adorno and his associates (1950). 
lo Most analysts within this paradigm cannot explain race relations in Latin America, Brazil, and 
the Caribbean, or just deny that these societies have race relations at  all. For instance, Parks 
claimed that although Brazil had "races" and there were obvious differences among them, Brazil 
did not have race relations since "One speaks of race relations when there is a race problem, and 
there is lio race problem in Brazil, or if there is, it is very little if a t  all concerned with the people 
of African and European origin" (Park 1950: 82). The literature on race relations in Brazil has 
grown exponentially since the work of Florestan Fernandes and Roger Bastide Race Relations 
Between Blacks and Whites in Sao Paulo was published in 1955. For a pathbreaking analysis of 
race relations in Brazil, see Anani Dzidzienyo, "The Position of Blacks in Brazilian Society", in 
Ben Whitaker (ed.), The Fourth WorM (London: Sidwick and Jackson, 1972). 
contemporary racism as one of the "legacies of white workerism" (Itoediger 1991: 176). Again, if 
racism is just a legacy, then it does not have any contemporary materiality or structure. 
7) Racism is analyzed in a circular manner. "If racism is defined as  the behavior that 
results from the belief, its discovery becomes ensnared in a circularity--racism is a belief that 
produces behavior, which is itself racism" (Webster 1992: 84). The existence of racism is 
established by racist behavior which itself proves the existence of racism; racism, for these 
analysts, is a phenomenon like God: the Alpha and the Omega. This circularity stems from not 
grounding racism on real social relations among the races. If racism, viewed as  an ideology, was 
seen as  having a material foundation, then its examination could be associated with racial practices 
rather than to mere ideas and the problem of circularity would be avoided. 
Some radical authors have developed alternative frameworks which explicitly attempt u, 
overcome the-limitations pointed out in this section. Because of their significance, I will review the 
Marxist, the institutionalist, the internal colonialism, and the racial formation perspectives on racial 
phenomena. 
Some Alternative Frameworks to Interpret Racial Matters 
A) The Marxist Perspective 
The central ideas of Marxism are that class is the central explanatory variable of social life 
and that class struggle is the main dynamic of society. Hence other types of social divisions and 
collective conflict are downplayed and regarded as derivations of the class structure (Aronowitz 
1992). In the case of racism, the orthodoxl1 Marxist position is that racism is an ideology used by 
the bourgeoisie to divide workers. In the words of Albert Szymanski, racism or racialism is: 
l1 One of the best representatives of the orthodox Marxist view on race and racism is Victor 
Perlo, Economics of Racism U.S.A.: Roots of Black Inequality (New York: International Publishers, 
1975). But alongside this orthodox view, many African American Marxists like W.E.B. Dubois, 
C.L.R. James, and, more recently, Manning Marable, have questioned the simplistic analysis of 
racism of their white counterparts. For particularly biting criticisms of the traditional Marxist 
view on racial matters see James Boggs, Racism and the Class Struggle (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1970); Robert L. Allen Reluctant Reformers (Washington: Howard University Press, 
[A] legitimating ideology for an exploitative structure. Racist ideology 
propagated in the media, educational system, and other institutions, together 
with the actual distribution of relative petty advantage within the working 
class serves to disorganize the entire working class including the ethnic 
majority, thereby allowing capital to more effectively exploit most majority 
group workers" (Szymanski 1983: 402). 
Although some suggest that there is a racial structure (Szymanski 1981; Wolpe 1986)' 
they underscore the "capitalist nature of racist structures, racialist ideology, and interpersonal 
racism" (Szymanski 1983: 431). According to Oliver Cox, one of the first Marxist-inspired 
analysts to deal with racial matters, racism or race prejudice was "a social attitude propagated 
among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as  inferior so 
that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may be justified" (Cox 1948: 
. .  . . .. . 393). This social attitude or ideology emerged in the 15th century as a practical consequence of the 
b * Y  ;-.>. . -. - labor needs of European imperialists. In Cox's words: 
1.: .: - . 1 . ,. . . . The socioeconomic matrix of racial antagonism involved the commercialization 
- - r  . of human labor in the West Indies. the East Lndies, and in America, the intense . ,. -. competition among businessmen of different western European cities for the 
capitalist exploitation of the resources of this area, the development of 
. - nationalism and the consolidation of European nations, and the decline of the 
influence of the Roman Catholic Church with its mystical inhibitions to the free 
exploitation of economic resources. Racial antagonism attained full maturity 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the sun no longer set on 
British soil and the great nationalistic powers of Europe began to justify their 
economic designs upon weaker European peoples with subtle theories of racial 
superiority and masterhood (Cox 1948: 330). 
But did Cox view race relations and racial antagonism as "racial"? Cox, as all Marxists, 
argued that they were not. European imperialists justified their exploitation of the people and 
resources of the New World in racial terms but, in Cox's estimation, they essentially established 
"labor-capital profit relationships" or "proletarian bourgeois relations" (Cox 1948: 3 36). Racial 
exploitation was regarded as a special form of class exploitation (Cox 1948: 344). The racial 
component originated from the proletarianization of a whole people (people of color) in contrast to 
the partial proletarianization experienced by whites. Hence, given that the racial element in 
1974) and Harold Cruse, Rebellion o r  Revolution (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 
1968). 
societies was not real, Cox concluded that "racial minorities" should strive towards assimilation 
and ultimately struggle for socialism along with White workers. 
Another Marxist interpretation of racism that gained popularity in the seventies and 
eighties was that of Edna Bonacich (1980a, 1980b). The twist in her approach is that rather than 
regarding race relations and racism as fundamentally orchestrated by the bourgeoisie, she 
regarded them as the product of a split labor market giving theoretical primacy to intm- working 
class divisions. Bonacich defined a split labor market as situation where there is "a difference in 
the price of labor between two or more groups of workers holding constant their efficiency and 
productivity" (Bonacich 1980b: 343-44). According to Bonacich, a split labor market has existed in 
the U.S. since slavery times with Blacks as  the more cheaply priced labor. After slavery was 
.abolished, Bonacich attributes the cheapness of Black laborers to a "difference in labor militance" 
as compared to'white workers (p.8345). White workers --whether longlestablished in the U.S. or 
recent immigrants-- are described as  having a "greater ... recognition of class conflict with the 
capitalist class" (p. 346). Although -Bonacich is aware of the fact "that a number of 'white' unions 
openly excluded blacks while manj7 others discriminated more covertly," she stresses as pivotal 
the differential historical union experience of both groups.12 Thus she concludes that the lesser 
degree of historical involvement of Blacks in labor unions accounts for their utilization a s  cheap 
laborers by capitalists in the post World War I1 period (p. 347). 
As capitalists began using Blacks a s  strike-breakers and attempted to displace white 
workers. white workers mounted a resistance to maintain their status. Such "resistance"13 
l2 This argument strikes me a s  blaming the victim in disguise. For two excellent alternative 
readings of why Blacks did not join unions with their "brothers and sisters," see Philip Foner's 
excellent Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1981 (1981) and David Roediger's The 
Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (1991). 
l3 Bonacich downplays interpretations of this "resistance" based on racial prejudice against 
Blacks. Therefore, she explains the race riots that occurred in the 1919-1940 period as 
expressions of class protectionism from whites facing "threats" from Black workers. This 
interpretation naturalizes the racial view of "they are taking our jobs" and conveniently ignores 
the fact that the white working class was formed in a racialized fashion. On this point, Black 
historian Carter G. Woodson (1947) comrnmented that: 
involved in earlier stages the total exclusion of Blacks from unions and caste-like occupat.ional 
.divisions. With the enactment of New Deal legislation in the thirties --specifically, section 7a of the 
NIRA of 1933 and the Wagner Act of 193%- and the ensuing strengthening of unionism and the 
illegalization of paying lower wages to certain workers for similar work, Black and white workers 
entered into a short period of "radical coalition" (Bonacich 1980b: 354). As capitalists countered 
the protective legislation of the thirties --and the concomitant rising costs of labor-- with relocation 
overseas, plarit relocations a t  home, and automation, Blacks were disproportionally hurt due to 
their weak market position and some systemic "rigidities" (pp. 355-358). This has extended the 
life of the split labor market by creating a "class of hard-core unemployed in the ghettos" (p. 358). 
There are, however, some limitations to orthodox Marxist views on racial matters. First, - . .  
. * z- as  suggested above, Marxists regard racism and racial antagonism as products of class dynamics. 
.>-+ Regardless of whether the antagonism is viewed as  promoted by capitalists (Cox 1948; Szymanski 
-.- 1981) or a s  the product of intra-working class strife (Bonacich 1980a, 1980b) or as the outcome of . - 
fT,z- ' 
contingent historical processes (Saxton 1990), racial strife is viewed as  not having a real racial 
component, that is, as not having its own structure. Second, in all its versions, racial strife is 
ez;.. 
conceived as emanating from false interests. Because the unity of the working class and the 
impending socialist revolution are a priori Marxists axioms, racial (or for that matter, gender- 
based) struggle cannot be viewed as  having its own material basis (that is, a s  based on the 
As Negroes in the North and West, therefore, were pitted against the trades 
unions, they engendered much feeling between the races.by allying themselves 
with the capitalists to serve as  strikebreakers. In this case, however, the trades 
unions themselves were to be blamed. The only time the Negroes could work under 
such circumstance 'was when the whites were striking, and it is not surprising that 
some of them easily yielded then to the temptation. In those unions in which the 
Negroes were recognized, they stood with their white co-workers in every instance 
of making a reasonable demand of their employers. Some of these unions, however, 
accepted Negroes as  merely as  a subterfuge to prevent them from engaging in 
strikebreaking. When the Negroes appealed for work, identifying themselves a s  
members of the union in control, they were turned-away with the subterfuge that 
no vacancies existed, while a t  the same time white men were gladly received 
(Woodson 1947: 439). 
different inkrests of the actors involved). l4 Consequently, racism must be explained as 
"ideological" or "irrational." (Although Bonacich views some of these struggles as "rational," they 
are "rational" in the class rather than the racial sense.) Finally, given that racial ~henomena are 
not deemed as independent and are essentially classified as  "ideological," Marxists shy away from 
performing any in-depth analysis of the politics and ideologies of race (see Omi and Winant 1986). 
Recently some Marxist analysts --many of them inspired by the pivotal work of Stuart 
Hal] (1980)-- have attempted to develop more flexible interpretations of racial phenomena (Miles 
and Phizacklea 1984; Cohen 1989; Miles 1989, 1993; Carchedi 1987; Wolpe 1986; Solomos 1986, 
1989). John Solomos, for instance, after critically reviewing several Marxist approaches to racial 
matters, concluded that: 
(a) there is no problem of 'race relations' which can be thought of separately 
from the structural (economic, political, and ideological) features of capitalist 
society; (b) there can be no general Marxist theory of racism, since each 
historical situation needs to be analyzed in its own specificity; and (c) 'racial' 
and 'ethnic' divisions cannot be reduced to or seen as  completely determined by 
the structural contradictions of capitalist societies (Solomos 1986: 104). 
Harold Wolpe has suggested that what is needed to adequately grasp issues of race is a 
non-reductionist conception of class. Class, for Wolpe, should be regarded as  a process rather than 
a s  an abstract category. In his own words, class "is constituted, not as  unified social force, but as  
a patchwork of segments which are differentiated and divided on a variety of bases and by varied 
processes" (Wolpe 1986: 12 1). This conceptualization allows classes to have fragments with 
unique interests based on ethnicity, race or gender. 
Yet despite providing some honest indictments of the class reductionist reading of racial 
phenomena, both analysts share many of the limitations of the orthodox view. First, both Solomos 
and Wolpe conceive the context --the structure-- of the social system as fundamentally capitalist in 
nature and "racialism" as  something that may affect its character. Although this is a theoretical 
and political break with the orthodox Marxist position, it still precludes the possibility of racism 
l4 For a similar critique of the Marxist myopia to gender oppression and the materiality of 
patriarchy see Christine Delphy, Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression 
(Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984). 
having its own structure (albeit articulated with capitalism and patriarchy).15 That is why, for 
example, in Wolpe's earlier work in South Africa the question was examining within class 
stratification (1970) and in his more recent work how race has been "interiorized" in the class 
struggle (1986: 111) and, for Solomos, it has been how racism affects politics and ideology in 
Britain (1986; 1989). Second, they stress a priori class a s  the central organizing principle of social 
systems and hence race is regarded as  a secondary element that fm.ctures or stnztifies class. Third, 
in their analysis (particularly Solomos) racism is still viewed in fundamentally ideological terms. 
Finally, and despite their poignant criticism of class-reductionist views on racial matters, they 
have not provided any new theoretical tools with which to analyze the relative autonomous 
structural character of race and racism in social systems. 
B) The Institutionalist Perspective 
The institutionalist perspective emerged out of the struggle of racial minorities in the 
'sixties (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Knowles and Prewitt 1969; Chesler 1976; Wellman 197 7; 
Alvarez, Lutterman, e t  al. 1979). In contrast to the liberal view on race relations which a t  the 
time blamed the "ills of racism" on poor White southerners,'proponents of this viewpoint 
proclK?med that racism was society-wide and that. it affected all White Americans. This 
perspective, forcibly put forward by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton in their book Black 
Power (1967), defined racism as  "the predications of decisions and policies on considerations of 
race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group." 
Furthermore, they proposed a distinction between individual racism or overtly racist acts 
l5 On this point Italian Marxist Guglielrno Carchedi (19871, after acknowledging that there are 
special groups in society who are subject to specific forms of domination (e.g., women, Blacks, 
young people, 'sexual deviants'), ends up devaluating the specificity of their domination. This is 
accomplished by arguing that although these forms of domination are not class-specific they are 
class-determined, that is, "they are functional for the domination of the capitalist class" (Carchedi 
1987: 110). Thus, Carchedi concludes in typical Marxist fashion, that "socialism is in the interest, 
and must be the result of the struggle, of all those subjected to a type of domination functional for 
the reproduction of the capitalist system" (p. 11; emphasis in original). Similarly, British Marxist 
Gerry A. Cohen after recognizing the failure of Marxism of appreciating that "divisions of identity 
are as  deep as those of class" reduces "racial exploitation" (his term) to class exploitation. In his 
words, "racial exploitation is (largely) relegation to an exploited class .because of race" (Cohen 
1989: 159). 
committed by individuals and institutional racism or the covedy racial outcomes produced through 
the "normal" operations of American institutions. Chesler provided one of the definitions that 
attracted the most attention in academic and workshop circles: the prejudice plus power definition. 
In Chesler's own words, racism requires "an ideology of explicit or implicit superiority or 
advantage of one racial group over another, plus the institutional power to implement that 
ideology in social operations" (Chesler 1976: 22; see also Katz 1978: 10). In its most radical 
version (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967), racism was seen an outgrowth of colonialism and 
institutional racism as the mechanism to keep racial minorities (Blacks in particular) in a colonized 
status. Therefore, since Blacks were seen as subordinated to Whites politically, economically, and 
sociallj: (p. 6), radical trtstitutionalists advocated the struggle of Blacks for national liberation. 
The institutionalist perspective contributed to dispel some of the myths perpetuated by the 
dominant paradigm. Researchers gathered data showing the systematic &sadvantages that Blacks 
suffered in economic, educational, judicial, political, and health related institutions, forcefully 
pointing out the pervasiveness of racism (see Knowles and Prewitt 1969). Moreover, their 
persistent assertion that all Whites received advantages from the racial order and that there was 
a pressing need to challenge all institutions politicized an academia sick with the belief that it was 
not part of the problem. This perspective, as well as its offshoot --the internal colonialism 
perspective-- helped to politicize the discussion about race in academic circles. 
Yet despite its valuable political contributions, this perspective did not pose a serious 
theomtical challenge to the dominant conception of racism in the social sciences. At the theoretical 
level this perspective developed a melange where everything could be "racist." In this view racism 
was ideas or a "sense of racial superiority" but also practices and processes that lead to 
discrimination. More significantly, the institutionalist perspective still grounded racism at the 
ideological level thus failing to attack the theoretical myopia of the dominant perspective. This 
ideological grounding of racism is evident in the following quotation from Carmichael and 
Hamilton's book: 
Institutional racism relies on the active and pervasive operation of anti-black 
attitudes and practices. A sense of superior group position prevails: whites are 
"better" than blacks; therefore blacks should be subordinated to whites. This is 
a m i s t  attitude and it permeates the society, on both the individual and 
institutional level, covertly and overtly (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967: 5;' my 
emphasis). 
Robert Miles listed some additional limitations of this perspective (1989). First, this 
perspective is intrinsically linked to a naive view of social stratification where race is the sole basis 
of social division. Second, the definition of racism is so inclusive that it loses its theoretical and 
even political usefulness. Third, its basic Black-white division minimized the "racialization" that 
some "white" groups experienced --e.g., the Irish16 and the Jews. Incidentally, this simplistic 
division tended to minimize the mcialized experiences of other minorities in the U.S. Fourth, the 
1 . ..- perspective shuns the problem of intentionality altogether, which leads to analytical and political 
g'-& 
problems. Analytically, it detours us from understanding the processes that lead some whites to 
. ;- exhibit overtly, covertly, or altogether non-racist behavior. (Yet, and this point is missed by Miles .. .. 
:. . 
-: F-, - (1989), regardless of the racial practices and views of individual whites, all of them receive some - 3 
-.. f. benefits from the operation of the racial order.) Politically, it makes the likelihood and desirability 
of an alliance a non-issue because all whites are designated a s  "racist." Finally, and as in the case . 
3. .a '.
of the-dominant perspective on racism, this perspective is ensnared in circularity. Racism, which is 
or can be almost everything, is proven by anything done (or not done) by. whites (Miles 1989: 56). 
The analyst identifies the existence of racism because any action done by whites is labeled as 
racist. 
C) The Internal Colonialism Perspective 
A group of authors, inspired by the struggles of several racial minority groups in the 
sixties and early seventies, postulated that racism was structured by the colonial status of racial 
minorities in the U.S. (Moore 1970; Blauner 1972). As in the case of the institutional perspective, 
l6 For a magnificent example of the negative racialization experienced by the Irish in Lreland see 
Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the White Race (London and New York: Verso, 1994). 
proponents of the internal colonial framework argued that racism l7 was institutionalized and 
based upon a system in which the white majority "raises its social position by exploiting, 
controlling, and keeping down others who are categorized in racial or ethnic terms" (Blauner 1972: 
22). According to Robert Blauner, the foremost exponent of this perspective, modern racism 
emerged in the following way: 
The association of race consciousness with social relations based on the 
oppression of one group by another is the logical prerequisite. for the emergence 
of racism. The conquest of people of color by white Westerners, the 
establishment of slavery as an institution along color lines, and the 
consolidation of the racial principle of 
economic exploitation in colonial societies led to the elaboration and 
solidification of the racist potential of earlier modes of thought (Blauner 1972: 
2 1). 
After different Third World peoples were forcefully moved to the U.S., a racial order was 
. -. :established..with its own. dynamics. .Central to the .operation of such order was the. maintenance of 
white privilege. Although the racial order and the particular form of racial oppression were viewed 
as  changing throughout history, white privilege was viewed .as a constant systemic fact. Blauner 
argued, similar to institutionalists, that white advantages accrued a t  all levels but, unlike them, 
he gave primacy t;o "the special advantage of the white population in the labor market" since in 
"industrial capitalism economic institutions are central, and occupational role is the major 
determinant of social status and life style" (Blauner 1972: 23). 
This framework took head-on many of the limitations of mainstream approaches to race 
relations in the U.S. While most of the prevailing perspectives were ahistorical and postulated 
"race cycles" (Park 1950) or ethnic patterns (Glazer and Moyniham 1970) that would repeat 
themselves, the internal colonial model was very historical (Barrera 1979) and informed by the 
differences between the historical experiences of white ethnics and racial minorities. Moreover, the 
internal colonial perspective challenged the purely psychological view of racism a t  many levels. 
Blauner advanced several definitions of racism in his book. The most comprehensive regarded 
racism as  "a principle of social domination by which a group seen as  inferior in alleged biological 
characteristics is exploited, controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superordinate 
group" (1972: 84). 
First and foremost, it challenged the dogma of conceiving of racism as  virulent prejudice of some 
individuals by suggesting that its existence was not a necessary condition of racial orders. Racism, 
in Blamer's view, had an objective reality "located in the actual existence of domination and 
hierarchy" (Blamer 1969: 10). As with the institutionalist perspective, it forced the consideration 
of racism or raciaVcolonial oppression as systemic, comprehensive (all actors involved), and 
rational (based on the interests of Whites). Furthermore, it downplayed the educational road to the 
abolition of racism and, as  with other systems of exploitation, it viewed violence as a necessary 
requisite to transform the racial order (see Blauner 1972: 104). 
Although this approach represented a refinement of the institutionalist perspective and 
provided new insights for the study of race relations, it still had some serious limitations. First, 
p-= because it was centered on the colonial nature of racial subordination, it assumed a national unity 
*.. among both the dominant and subordinated "races" and, thus, neglected the class --and gender-- 
. -  - -.. - . . divisions among them. Also, by positing the centrality of economic oppression, it missed completely 
F' .- " the process of economic marginalization and exclusion that some races may experience. For 
- instance, how would an analyst with this theoretical postulate interpret the contemporary status 
J 
. -2. - of "u~derclass" African Americans (Omi and Winant 1986; Wilson 1987) or of American Indians? 
Finally, the categories elaborated by Blamer failed to provide a structural understanding of 
racism. Despite asserting that racism was systemic, Blauner did not provide the theoretical tools 
to study how racism is reproduced in societies. Notwithstanding these limitations, many of the 
insights developed by the authors associated with this perspective are incorporated in the 
alternative framework developed in this paper. 
D) The Racial Formation Perspective 
The recent work of Howard Winant and Michael Omi represents a theoretical 
breakthrough in the area of race relations. In their Racial Formation in the United States (1986) . 
the authors provide a thorough critique of previous theoretical approaches and suggest a new 
approach for the study of racial phenomena: the racial formation perspective. They define racial 
formation as the "process by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and 
importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings" (Omi 
and Winant 1986: 61) The essence of this approach is the idea that race "is a phenomenon whose 
meaning is contested throughout social life" (Winant 1994: 23). The very existence of the category 
race is viewed as  the outcome of mialization or "the extension of racial meaning to a previously 
unclassified relationship, social practice or group ...[ it] is an ideological process, an  historically 
specific one. (Omi and Winant 1986: 64). In their view, race should be regarded as an organizing 
principle of social relationships which, a t  the micro level, shapes the identity of individual actors, 
and a t  the macro level, shapes all spheres of social life. Although racialization affects all social 
spheres, Omi and Winant assign a primary role to the political level,18 particularly to the "racial 
state" which they regard as  the factor of cohesion of the racial order. Hence racial conflict, 
particularly in the post-Civil Rights era, is viewed as playing itself out a t  the state level (Omi and 
Winant 1986:- 68-69). 
Equipped with these categories, Omi and Winant review the recent history of racial 
formation in the United States. They argue that as the Civil Rights Movement expanded to include 
the masses of Black people it rearticulated and radicalized the collective meaning of Black 
subjectivity. The new subjectivity, symbolized a t  the cultural level by the transition from being 
llNegrosl' to "Blacks," involved a change in the tactics to challenge the racial order. Direct and 
collective strategies replaced individual and indirect forms of contestation. According to Omi and 
Winant, the first phase of the Civil Rights Movement produced real although limited reforms (e.g., 
enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights legislation, and registration of 
millions of southern Black voters). However, the economic status of most Blacks was left 
unaffected by these reforms. This produced the radicalization of a segment of the movement which 
manifested itself in the politics of Black Power. Despite the amorphous character of this political 
l8 In Winant's recent book Racial Conditions the fundamentally political character of racialization 
is attributed to the fact that "elites, popular movements, state agencies, cultural and religious 
organizations, and intellectuals of all types develop racial projects, which interpret and reinterpret 
the meaning of race ... These projects are often explicitly, but always implicitly, political" (Winant 
1994: 24). 
movement --from self-help to revolutionary nationalists- it involved a further rearticulation of the 
political and cultural agenda of Blacks. For many Black Power politicians, the question became not 
so much gaining "rights" but gaining "power." 
The state's response to the demands of the racial social movement of the sixties was 
twofold. On the one hand, it absorbed some demands (state guarantees for civil and political rights) 
and actors (some "militant" leaders were coopted) and, on the other hand, it insulated crucial 
areas of state activity (e.g., tax policy) from any contestation by defining them a s  nonracial. As 
the movement fragmented in the late sixties, the state was able to repress some of the most 
radical segments and coopt the reformist leadership. Moreover, the state's acquiescence tq the 
demands of racial minorities for civil and political rights entailed recasting the racial movement - .. . 
" -23. 
into another "interest group" and channeling its activities through "normal" politics. 
C? 




dislocations of the seventies. As in other periods in U.S. history, these dislocations were blamed on 
.. -. 
- racial minorities (e.g., the expansion of the welfare state was viewed as  the cause of the economic 
:=&; 
demise of the U.S.). This set the stage for the rearticulation of racial ideology and politics carried 
c-z. , 
out by .neoconservatives and the new7 right around the notion of "reverse racism." Although this 
rearticulation has not rolled back the historical clock by arguing against the principle of racial 
equality and for segregation, it has been successful in challenging all the means to achieve equality 
(from state spending, to busing, to affirmative action). 
The racial formation perspective is pathbreaking and provides some promising tools for the 
analysis of racialized societies nonetheless, it still has some significant limitations. First, Omi and 
Winant's (1936) concepts of racial formation and rucialization give undue emphasis to ideological 
processes. Both concepts are helpful in grasping how racial meanings are formed and marticuhted 
but they do not resolve the question of how it is that racial orders are structured. Arguing that 
racial classifications are permanently contested is & elaboration of the old idea that race is a 
socially constructed category. The issue is that this argument does.not make clear whether or not 
race becomes an independent basis of group association and action. Second, although in their book 
there are hints of a conception of races as  social collectivities with different interests, Omi and 
Winant stop short of developing such view. Lacking this conception makes their description of 
political contestation over racial matters look as  quarrels over meanings rather than over positions 
in the racial order. In their approach, it is unclear why people fight over racial matters and why 
they endorse or contest racial projects (see footnote 30). Third, Omi and Winant's analysis of the 
most recent rearticulation of racial ideology 'in the U.S. leaves out a comprehensive or systemic 
view of the process. The change is described as  singularly carried out by the right wing and 
neoconservatives instead of reflecting a general change in the U.S. racial structure. In order to 
make this claim, Omi and Winant would have to include the agency of all the members of the 
dominant race --rather than privileging some actors-- and conceive the change as  affecting all the 
levels of the social formation --rather than privileging the political level. Finally, although I am 
sympathetic to the idea of regarding race as  "a fundamental organizing principle of social 
relationships" (Omi and Winant 1986: 66),  their theoretical framework comes close to race- 
reductionism in-many areas. For instance, their conceptualization of the state as  the "racial 
state," although borrowed from structuralist Marxism. leaves aside the capitalist. --as well as the 
patriarchal-- character of the state. l9 
So far, I have pointed to the limitations of both the traditional conception of racism and its 
most influential counter-alternatives. The core of my critique has been that all these frameworks 
fail to develop a structural understanding of racial matters. In the next section I provide a 
preliminary theoretical apparatus to interpret racial phenomena in such a manner. 
l9 This problem is partially addressed in Howard Winant's recent Racial Conditions (1994) 
through the Gramscian concept of hegemony which he defines a s  "a form of rule that operates by 
constructing its subjects and incorporating contestation" (p. 113). According to Winant this form of 
rule prevails in most "modern" societies and organizes, among other things, cleavages based on 
class, race, and gender. 
111. Towards An Alternative Conceptualization of 'Racism' 
Since the term mcism has been equated with a psychological or an  ideological phenomenon, 
I propose the concept of racialized social as  the starting point for my alternative 
\ 
framework. Racialized social systems refers to societies in which the economic, political, social,21 
and ideological levels are structured upon the placement of actors in racial categories or 
races. They are partially structured by race because modern social systems articulate two or more 
forms of hierarchical patterns (Hall 1980; Williams 1990; Winant 1994). This implies that the 
phenomenon that has been coded as racism and regarded more or less as  a free-floating ideology 
has a structural foundation. 
.- - In all racialized social systems the placement of people in racial categories involves some -. . . 
= form of hierarchs22 which produces very definite social relations among the races. The race 
ascribed the superior position tends to receive higher levels of economic remuneration and access rsi .* 
-. to better occupations andlor prospects in the labor market; has a primary position in the political 
--- r5.- system; is granted higher levels of social estimation (e.g., is viewed as  "smarter," "better looking," 
.CL 
etc.); and, in many cases, has the license to draw physical (segregation) as well as  social (racial 
#.*. 
etiquette) boundaries between itself and other races; and, finally, receives what Dubois called a 
20 I employ the concept of social system in a non-Parsonian manner. I do not assume that a social 
system tends to be in equilibrium and that all its components are functional to it. Here it is used to 
refer to the various sets of structures that taken together comprise society. In our society the three 
main structures that shape the social system are patriarchy, capitalism, and the racial structure. 
In traditional structural accounts of Marxism, the social level (civil society) is subsumed within 
the economic, the political, and the ideological levels. I do not subscribe to that depiction of society 
and suggest that there is a social level of group interaction and practices (the everyday life). 
2 2  This argument applies only to racialized social systems. In contrast, the basis of ethnic conflict. 
needs not be over relations of superiors and subordinates as  conflict in many African and 
European countries illustrates. On this point, see Donald Noel "A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic 
Stratification," Social Problems, 16 (Fall 1968), pp. 157-72; see also Richard A. Schermerhorn, 
Comparative Ethnic Relations (New York: Random House, 1970) and Donald Horowitz, Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
"psychological wage" (Marable 1983; Roediger 199 1). The totality of these racialized social 
relations constitutes the racial structure24 of a society. 
Insofar as the races receive different social rewards a t  all levels they develop dissimilar 
objective interests which can be detected in their struggles for either the transformation (the 
struggle of the subordinated race) or the maintenance (the struggle of the dominant race) of a 
particular racial order. Those interests are collective rather than individual; are based on relations 
between races rather than on particular group needs; and finally, are not structural but 
practical.25 In other words, although the interests of the races can be detected from their pmtices 
they are not subjective/individual but collective and shaped by the field of real practical alternatives 
--itself rooted in the power struggles among the races (see Cox 1948: 569). Although the objective 
general interests of a race may ultimately lie in the complete elimination of the racial character of 
a society, its field of.real alternatives may not include that possibility. For instance, the historical 
23 On the point of the distribution~of,social rewards along racial lines in racialized systems see 
Blumer (1954), Shibutani and Kwan (1966), van den Bergue (1967), Blalock (1967), Schermerhon 
(1970), and Wilson (1973). 
24 I do not subscribe to the structuralist Marxist view of the "social structure" which posits that is 
a "set of empty spaces or positions" to be filled by actors who become plain "bearers of the 
structure" (Poulantzas 1982; Wright 1978 and 1985). This conception eliminates actors, history, 
and relationships from the structure and makes it into a mysterious entity deeply hidden in 
society. An alternative conception of the social structure that does not exclude these elements is 
that of Joseph H. Whitmeyer (1994) who defines it as "the networks of (interactional) 
relationships among actors as  well a s  the distributions of socially meaningful characteristics of 
actors and aggregates of actors" (154). For similar but more intricate conceptions of the social 
structure that are relational and which incorporate the agency of actors a s  well a s  the embodiments 
of symbolic human action (culture) a s  part of the social structure see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: 
A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984): 
William H. Sewell, Jr .  "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American 
Journal of Sociology 98: 1-29; and Sharon Hays, "Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of 
Culture," Sociological Theory 21:l March 1994, 57-72. 
25 Here I am following Poulantzas' idea of locating the interests of actors in their real struggles 
rather than making a separation between latent (real objective) and manifest (subjective) 
interests. Reading the following quote with the concept of race instead of class in mind elaborates 
my point. 
The concept of interests can only be related to the field of practices, in so far as interests 
are always interests of a class [or a race], of supports distributed in social classes.[or 
socially constituted races] (Poulantzas 1982: 11 1). 
struggle against chattel slavery did not lead to the development of race-free societies but to the 
elaboration of social systems with a different kind of racialization. Why? Because that option was 
not in the map of real alternatives given that the non-slave populations had the capacity (power) 
to preserve some type of racial privilege. The historical "exceptions" occurred in racialized 
societies where the power of the non-slaves was almost completely superseded by the power of the 
slave population.26 
A simple criticism of the argument advanced so far would be that it ignores the internal 
divisions of the races along class and gender lines. However, such criticism does not deal squarely 
with the issue at hand. The fact that not all the members of the superordinate race receive the 
same levels of rewards and, conversely, that not all the members of the subordinate race or races 
- ,  ,_ are a t  the bottom of the social order, does not negate the fact that races, as  social groupings, are 
F". 
z., . 
in either a superordinate or a subordinate position in a social system. Historically the mcialization 
;= 
of social systems did not imply the exclusion of other forms of oppression. In fact, mialization 
b - -  
occurred in social formations that were structured by class a s  well as gender. Hence, in these 
w-x 
.*- :.- .
societies class and gender structurations are lived in mcialized terms and, conversely, the mcial 
experience of subjects is fragmented along class and gender lines. The important question of which 
interests move actors to struggle is historically contingent and cannot be ascertained a priori 
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Depending of the character of mcialization in a society, class 
interests may take precedence over racial ones (e.g., contemporary Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico). 
In other situations, racial interests may take precedence over class interests and unify most 
members of a racial group against "the system" (slavery and apartheid periods in U.S: history). 
And yet the intersection of class and racial interests may be what moves people to action in other 
26 Here I am referring to cases like Haiti. Nonetheless, recent research has suggested that even 
in places like Haiti, the abolition of slavery did not end totally the mcialized character of the social 
formation (Trouillot 1990). 
situations (the race-class interests of the Black poor and working class seem to be increasingly a t  
odds with those of middle class Blacks in contemporary u . s . ) ~ ~  
Because mcial actors are also classed and gendered, it is necessary that analysts control 
for class and gender to ascertain the material advantages that accrue to a dominant race. In a 
racialized society like ours, the independent effects of race are assessed by analysts who: 1) 
compare data between Whites and nonwhites in the same class and gender position, 2) evaluate 
the proportion as well as the general character of the participation of the races in some domain of 
life, and 3) examine racial data from all levels --social, political, economic, and ideological-- to 
establish the general position of racial groups in a social system. 
The first of these elements has become standard practice in sociology. Hardly any serious 
sociologist presents racial data on income, occupational attainment, and other similar demographic 
measures without controlling for class *and gender. By doing this, analysts assume that they can 
measure the unadulterated effects of "discrimination" manifested in unexplained "residuals" (e.g. 
Farley 1984, '1993; Farley and Allen 1987). However, and despite the usefulness of this 
technique, it provides only a partial account of the "race effect" given that 1) a significant amount 
of racial data cannot be retrieved through surveys and 2) that the technique of "controlling for" 
neglects the obvious: why a group is overrepresented or underepresented in certain areas 
(Whatley and Wright 1994). Moreover, these analysts hold the presumption that it is possible to 
analyze the amount of discrimination in one domain (income, occupational status, etc.) "without 
analyzing the extent to which discrimination also affects the factors they hold constant" (Reich 
1976: 224). Hence to evaluate "race effects" in any domain, analysts must attempt to make sense 
of their findings as part of the totality of the racial structure. 
27 Some authors .have developed notions combining racidethnic positions with class. Milton M. 
Gordon developed the concept of "ethclass" but assumed that it had, a more or less, temporary 
character (1964). James A. Geschwender transformed that notion into the concept of race-class 
which he defined as "a social collectivity comprised of persons who are simultaneously members of 
the same class and the same race" (1977: 221; c.f. Mario Barrera 1979: 174-279). However, 
Geschwender views racial interests as somewhat less "objective" and "fundamental" than class 
interests. 
But what is the nature of races or, more properly, of racialized social groups? According to 
Orni and Winant (1986; see also Miles 1989) races are the outcome of the process of racialization 
which they define.as "the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified 
relationship, social practice or group" (p. 64). Historically,. the classification of a people in racial 
terms was an eminently political act. Categories like "Indians" and "Negroes" were invented 
(Jordan 1968; Berkhoffer 1978; Allen 1994) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to justify 
the conquest and exploitation of various peoples. The invention of such categories entails a 
dialectical process of construction; that is, the creation of a category of "Other" involves the 
creation of a category of "Same." If "Indians" are depicted as  "savages," Europeans are 
characterized as "civilized"; if "Blacks" are defined a s  natural candidates to slavery, "whites" are . - .. 
defined as  free subjects (Roediger 1991, 1994). However, although the racialization of peoples was 
$? 
- invented and did not override previous forins of social distinction based on class or gender, it did 
Z' 
not lead to imaginary relations but to new forms of human association with definite status 
" - 
differences. After the process of attaching meaning to a "people," that is, the process of formation 
5. ; % 
of racial categories, is instituted, race becomes a real category of group association and identity.28 
R - 
Because racial classifications partly organize and limit the life chances of racialized actors, real 
racial practices of opposition emerge. Regardless of the form of racial intercourse, it is in the realm 
of real racial relations that races can be recognized. Viewed in this light, races are the effect of 
racial practices of opposition ("we" versus "them") a t  the economic, political, social, and ideological 
levels.29 
28 This position clashes with the contemporary pronouncements of many scholars who advocate 
dropping altogether "racial" classifications andlor policies given that race is not real (Fields 1990; 
Webster 1993) or that it is "declining in significance" (Wilson 1978, 1987). For a recent critique of 
this attempt of silencing the "talli about race from above" see David Roediger, Towards the 
Abolition of Whiteness (London and New York: Verso, 1994). 
29 This last point is an extension of Poulantzas' view on-class. Races --as classes-- are not an 
"empirical thing;" they denote racialized social relations or racial practices at all levels (Poulantzas 
1982: 67). 
Races, a s  most social scientists acknowledge, are not biologically but socially determined 
categories of identity and group association. In this regard, they are analogous to class and gender 
(Amott and Matthaei 1991). Actors in racial positions are there not because they &e of X or Y 
race but because X or Y has been socially defined as  a race. The phenotypical characteristics of 
the actors are usually, although not always (Miles 1993), used to denote racial distinctions. (The 
Jews in many European nations and the Irish in England have been treated as  racial groups. 
Also, Indians in the United States have been viewed a s  a race despite the tremendous 
phenotypical m d  cultural variation among tribes.) Because races are socially constructed the 
meaning as well as the position assigned to them in the racial structure is always contested. What 
and who is to be Black or White or Indian reflects and affects the social, political, ideological, and 
economic struggles among the races. The global effects of these struggles can change the meaning 
of the racial.categories as well as the position of a racialized group in a social formation. On this t + 
latter point, the historical struggles of several "white ethnic" groups in the U.S. in their efforts to 
become accepted as legitimate whites or "Americans" are a good illustration (Litwack 1961; 
Williams 1990; Roediger 1991). Neither light-skinned --nor, for that matter, dark-skinned-- 
immigrants necessarily came as members of X or Y race to the U.S. In the case of light-skinned 
Europeans, after brief periods of "not-yet white" (Roediger 1994), they became white.30 Their 
struggle for inclusion had very specific implications: racial inclusion as  members of the white 
community allowed their Americanization and class mobility. On the other hand, in the case of 
dark-skinned immigrants from Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, the struggle was to not 
be classified as Black. The reason why they challenged the reclassification of their identity is 
simple. In the United States "Black" signified a subordinate status in society. Hence many of 
these groups struggled to keep their own ethnic or cultural identity as  denoted in expressions like 
"I am not black, I am Jamaican," or "I am not black, I am Senegalese" (Rodriguez 199 1; Sutton 
30 This does not mean that they necessarily lost their "ethnic" or "national" background (total 
assimilation). I t  only means that they soon accepted the new racial identity as  one that granted 
them some privileges in the U.S. On this point see chapter 7 in David Roediger's book The Wages 
of Whiteness (1992). 
and Makiesky-Barrow 1992; Kasinitz and Freidenberg-Herbstein 1992). Yet after a while many of 
these groups resolved this contradictory situation by accepting the duality of their social 
classification as  Black in the United States while retaining and nourishing their own cultural or 
ethnic heritage --itself deeply influenced by African  tradition^.^ 
Although the content of racial categories changes over time through manifold processes and 
struggles, m e  is not a secondary category of group association. Changes in the meaning of what is 
to be Black or White (the mcial formation that Omi and Winant [I9861 speak about) occur within 
the larger racial structure. This does not mean that the racial structure is immutable and 
completely independent of the action of racialized actors. It just means that the social relations 
among the races become institzttionalized and affect their social life whether individual members of 
,-. 7 
.?  * - .  t.he races want it or not. For instance, free Blacks during the slavery period struggled to change 
the meaning of Blackness and, specifically, to disassociate it from slavery. Yet they could not 
@ 
escape the larger racial structure that restricted their life chances and their freedom (Meir and 
r .  
Rudwick 1970; Franklin 1974; Berlin 1975). 
The placement of a group of people in a racial category stemmed from the 
B 
interest of powerful actors in the social system (capitalist class, planter class, colonizers, etc.) but, 
after racial categories were employed to organize social relations in a society, m e  became an 
independent --although articulated-- part of the operation of  the social system (Stone 1985). Here I 
depart from analysts like Winthrop Jordan (1968) and Robert Miles (1989, 1993) for whom the 
mere existence of a racial discourse is taken as a manifestation of the existence of a racial order. 
31 The question of identity is always multiple and layered. For an excellent discussion on the 
matter of Puerto Rican identity that is sensitive to the various webs that it entail see Juan Flores, 
Divided Borders: Essays on Puerto Rican Identity (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 1993). 
32 The motivation for mializ ing human relations may have originated in the interests of powerful 
actors but after social systems are mial ized ,  all members of the dominant race participate in the 
defense and reproduction of the racial structure. This is the crucial reason why Marxist analysts 
(Cox 1948; Reich 1976, 1981) have not been successful in analyzing racism. They have not been 
able to accept the fact that after the phenomenon originated with the expansion of European 
capitalism into the New World, it acquired a life of its own. The subjects that were mialized as 
belonging to the superior race, whether members of the dominant class or not, became zealous 
defenders of the racial order. 
Such position allows them to speak of racism in medieval times (Jordan) and to classify things like 
the inti-peasant views of French urbanites as  examples of racism (Miles 1993). In my view, we 
can only speak of racialized orders when a racial discourse is accompanied by real social relations 
of subordination and superordination among the races. The available evidence suggests that 
racialized social orders emerged after the imperialist expansion of Europe to the New World and 
Africa (Cox 1948; Williams 196 1; Williams 1990). 
But what are the dynamics that move racial issues in racialized systems? First and 
foremost, after a social formation is racialized, its "normal" dynamics always have a racial 
component (see Allen 1974). Societal struggles based on class or gender have a racial component 
since both social categories are also racialized, that is, both class and gender are constructed along 
racial lines. For example, white South African workers in the middle of a strike in 1922 inspired 
by the Russian revolution rallied under the slogan of "Workers of the world unite for a white 
South Africa." One of the concessions of the state to this "class" struggle was the passage of the 
Apprenticeship Act of 1922 "which prevented black workers acquiring apprenticeships" (Ticlitin 
1991: 26). Another example is how the struggles of women in the U.S. to attain their ciri! and 
human rights have always been plagued with deep racial tensions (Giddings 1984; Caraway 
1991). 
Nonetheless, some of the strife that transpires in a racialized social formation has a 
distinct racial character. I designate such strife as  racial contestation. Racial contestation is the 
struggle of racial gmups for systemic changes tegarding their position at one or more levels. These 
struggles may be at, the social (Who can be here? Who belongs here?), political (Who can vote? 
How much power should they have? Should they be citizens?), economic (Who should work and 
doing what? They are taking our jobs!), or ideological level (Black is beautiful! The transition from 
Negro to Black to African-American as the term to designate people of African descent in the 
U.S.). Although much of this contestation is often expressed at the individual level and has a 
disjointed character, a t  times it becomes collective and general and can effect meaningful systemic 
changes in the racial structure of a society. The form of the contestation may be relatively passive 
and subtle (in situations of fundamental overt racial domination such as slavery'and apartheid) or 
more active and overt (in quasi-democratic situations such as in the contemporary U.S.). However, 
in order to accomplish fundamental changes in'mcialized systems, the struggle must reach the point of 
overt protest (c.f. Cruse 1968, Hamilton 1972, Franklin 1973, hlarable 1983).  his does not mean ' 
tha t  a violent racially-based revolution is the only way of accomplishing effective changes in the 
relative position of racial groups. I t  is a simple extension of the argument tha t  social systems and 
their supporters need to be "shaken" in order for fundamental transformations to take place.33 
It is upon this structural foundation that  the phenomenon labeled by social scientists a s  
racism should be analyzed. Hence.racism is the segment of  the ideological structure of a social 
system that crystallizes racial notions and stereotypes. It provides the rationalizations upon which 
real social. political. social, and economic activities among the different races take place. 
Depending on the particular character of a racialized social system, the racial ideology may be 
highly (apartheid) or looselj islavery) developed and its content expressed in overt (U.S. until the 
sixties) or covert (U.S. after the sixties) terms. Although racism or racial ideology has its origins in 
real race relations, i t  acquires a degree of relative autonomy (Poulantzas 19S2) b1 the social 
system and performs, like all ideological constructions, very material and practical functions in 
society (Laclau 1977; Poulantzas 1982). Racism crystallizes the dogma upon which actors in the 
social &stem operate. For instance, racial notions about how Blacks and whites are or ought to be 
permeate the encounters between the members of these races; racism provides the rules for 
perceiving and dealing with the "other" in a mialized socieb. Although racist ideology is ultimately 
false it fulfills a very pmctical role in racialized societies and with pertinent effects in racial strife. 
33 The point is an  important one in the literature on revolutions and demotracy. For a clear 
example of the role of violence in the establishment of bourgeois democracies, see Barrington 
Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Beacon Press: Boston, 1966). In the 
literature on social movements, the essential works dealing with the role of violence in generating 
social change are Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 
1978) and Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements (Vintage Books: New 
York, 1979). 
Racial ideology, as  in the case of all the other levels of the social system, is permanently contested 
and thus changes over time. 
At this point it is possible to sketch the elements of the alternative framework presented 
here. First, the basis of my understanding of racism is the historical development of racialized 
social systems which allocate differential rewards to the races economically, politically, socially, 
and even psychologically. After a society becomes racialized a set of social relations based upon . 
racial distinctions develops a t  all societal levels. I designate the aggregate of those relations as the 
racial structltre of a society. Second, races are historically constituted according to the process of 
racialization: they become the effect of relations of opposition among racialized groups at  all levels 
of a social formation. Third. based upon this real structure. a racial ideology develops (what 
analysts have coded as racism). TI& ideology jracism) is not just. a "superstructursl" phenomenon 
(a mere reflection or the racialized system) but becomes the organizational glue that guides the 
actions of racial actors in society. It  becomes as  material as the racial relations it organizes. 
Fourth, most struggles in a racialized social system have a racial component but, a t  times, they 
acquire andlor exhibit a distinct racial character. Racial contestat,ion is the logical outcome of a 
society with a racial hierarchy. Any social formation that has some form of mcialization will 
alv~ays exhibit some form of racial contestation. Finally, the process of racial contestation reveals 
the different objective interests of the races in a racialized system. These points are summarized 
Figure 2 . . 
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The alternative framework for studying racial orders presented here has the following 
advantages over traditional views on racism. 
1 )  Racial phenomena are regarded as the "normal" outcome of the mcial structure of a society. 
Thus, all racial manifestations can be accounted for. Instead of explaining racial phenomena as  
deriving from other structures or from racism (conceived a s  a free-floating ideology), cultural, 
political, economic, social, and even psychological racial phenomena can be traced to the racial 
organization of that society. 
2 )  The changing nature of  what analysts label as "racism" is explained as the nonnal outcome 
of racial contestation in a racialized social system. Changes in racism are explained rather than 
described. Changes are due to specific contestations (struggles) a t  different levels among the races 
that result from their different interests. Such changes may transform the very nature of 
racialization and transform the global character of the racial relations in the system (the racial 
structure). Therefore, in this framework, change is viewed a s  a normal component of the system. 
3 )  This fmmework allows analysts to explain overt as well as covert mcial behavior. The 
covert or overt nature of racial contacts depends on the particular manner in which the process of 
racialization is manifested --itself dependent upon how race was orignally articulated in a social 
formation and upon the process of racial contestation. This implies that rather than conceiving of 
racism as  a universal and similarly orchestrated phenomenon, analysts should study "historically- 
specific racisms" (Hall 1980: 336). This is not a new insight given that Robert Park (1950) and 
Oliver Cox (1948) described in their works varieties of "situations of race relations" with very 
distinct forms of racial intercourse. 
4) Racially motivated behavior, whether the actors are conscious of it or not, is regarded as 
"mtional," that is, as based on the different interests of  the races. This framework accounts for 
Archie Bunker-type racial behavior as well as more "sophisticated" varieties. Since racial 
phenomena are viewed as  systemic, then, all the actors in the system participate in racial affairs. 
(The reason why some members of the dominant racial group tend to exhibit less virulence 
towards members of the subordinated races has to do with their larger degree of control over the 
form and the outcome of their racial interactions. In moments when they cannot control that 
interaction --revolts, general threats to whites, Blacks moving into "their" neighborhood, etc.-- 
they behave much like other members of the dominant race.) 
5 )  The reproduction of m i a l  phenomena in contemporary societies is explained in this 
framework by reference not to a long distant past but to its contemporary structure. Since racism is 
viewed a s  systemic (having a racial structure) and organized around the different interests of the 
races, the racial aspects of social systems today are viewed a s  fundamentally related to the real 
hierarchical relations among the races in those systems. The elimination of the racialized 
character of a social system entails the end of mcialization and, hence, of races altogether. This 
argument clashes with the popular prescription offered by most social scientists on how u, "cure" 
racism: education. This "solution" is the logical outcome of defining racism as a "belief." Since for 
most analysts racism is a matter of individuals subscribing to z n  irrational view, the cure is 
educating them; making them realize that racism is wrong. The alternative theorization offered 
here implies that since the phenomenon has material consequences for the races, the only way of 
"curing" society from racism is by eliminating its systemic roots. I t  is an open question --and one 
that is highly dependent upon the particular racial structure of the society in question-- whether 
this can be accomplished through democratic or through revolutionary means. 
6) This fkamework accounts for the ways in which miallethnic stereotypes emerge, are 
transformed, and disappear. Racial stereotypes are crystallized a t  the ideological level of a social 
system. These images ultimately indicate --although in distoded ways-- and justifi the real position 
of the stereotyped group in a social formation.34 Stereotypes may originate out of 1) the material 
reality or conditions endured by the group, 2) ignorance about the group, or 3) rigid distorted 
views on the physical, cultural, or moral nature of the group. However, once they emerge the 
stereotypes must relate to the real social position of the group in the racialized system. Hence, in 
34 David Montejano's (1987) analysis of the stereotypes held by Anglos about Chicanos in Texas 
helps to illustrate my argument. Mexicans in Texas were labeled as "dirty" and "greasers." This 
characterization was directly related to the fact that Chicanos were kept a s  agricultural laborers 
in the racelclass order of Texas. 
general terms, stereotypes are reproduced because they reflect the distinct real position and status 
of the group in the racialized system. As a corollary, racial or ethnic notions about a group 
disappear only when the status of the group mirrors that of the dominant racial or ethnic group in 
that society. (As an example, think about how the stereotypes and jokes about the Polish, Irish, 
Chinese, Japanese, and Jews in the United States have changed over time and, in some cases, 
have almost completely disappeared.) 
In the next section I advance a specific illustration of how a social system became 
racialized and how racialization became a permanent structural feature. The example is taken 
from the historical case of the United States and is not intended as an exhaustive discussion on 
U.S. history. To keep matters simple, the focus will be on Black-white relations --although other 
groups will be mentioned in a peripheral manner-- and racial matters will be underscored 
throughout the narrative sometimes a t  the expense of class and gender questions. 
IV. Racialization in the U.S.: 1600-1960s 
A) The Beginning: Conquest of Native Land and the "Indian Problem" 
The first group to experience the effects of'racialization in the U.S. was the Native 
American population. In the U.S., unlike in other localities of the New World, the incorporation of 
the "natives" as laborers did not occur is any meaningful way.35 This stems in part from the' 
"white settler" pattern of colonization chosen by the English (Reynolds 1961; Fredrickson 1981) in 
the thirteen American colonies, that is, driving off the natives and establishing colonies in the 
image of British towns. 
Although fur trading (Cornell 1988) provided most of the early profits: land was the main 
aim of the colonists, given that between 90 and 95 per cent of them were involved in agriculture 
(Nettles 1938: 229). Thus, as historian William T. Hagan notes, for most colonists "the Lndian 
35 Exceptions occurred in places such.as South Carolina and Georgia (Duncan 1982). 
was either a nuisance or a menace" (Hagan 1993; see also Jernegan 1929). Robert E. Berkhoffer 
described the consequences of this European activity in the following manner: 
English farming, however, whether of the southern or northern variety, 
depended upon the extensive and exclusive use of the land and so demanded, a t  
the same time that it promoted, the rapid expansion of White settlement upon 
native terri tory... Moreover, English agricultural practices presumed exclusivelj. 
White usage of  the land, thereby precluding any sharing of resources with Red 
neighbors, and English tenure and legal jurisdiction recognized this approach to 
territorial control. White uses of the land destroyed Indian subsistence from 
hunting as well a s  native horticulture and forced each tribe to contest Whik 
destruction of its economy, or to convert to White ways and methods, or to 
remove further into the frontier and encroach upon another tribe's territory. As 
a result of this conflict between native and English economies as well as cultures, 
the history of the mainland English colonies in the seventeenth century (and later) 
consists primarily of the expansion of  White settlement onto native lands and the 
peaceful or forceful transfer of ownership of those lands from Red to White hands 
(Berkhoffer 1978: 129; my emphasis). 
To justify their encroachment onto Indian land, English colonists developed a racial 
.discourse about themselves and the Indians; about the "civilized" and the "savage," about the 
"Christians" and the "heathens." That discourse revolved around a double-mindness about what it 
meant to be Indian meant, a contradictory imagery which had already been developed by other 
colonial powers (Pearce 1953; Jordan 1968; Berkhoffer 1978; Fredrickson 1981; Nash 1936). On 
the'one hand, Indians were portrayed as good-spirited, friendly, and handsome, and on the other 
hand, they were also viewed as treacherous, promiscuous, and ruthless. Despite this discrepancy, 
the imagery served the interests of the English very well. I t  served as  the ideological 
rationalization for the development of practical policies towards the Indians. If Indians did not 
object to the expansion of "civilization" into their territory, they were treated peacefully and set 
aside in reservations (Duncan 1982). However, if they resisted the English expansion into their 
territory, they were crushed (F'redrickson 1981). Although this racialization was initiated by 
powerful actors (the colonial proto-capitalists, if you will), it soon incorporated the active 
participation of "poor whites" for whom land was the means for social mobility (Nash 1986). 
The impact of the conquest and of the racial hierarchy established by Europeans had a 
devastating effect upon the native populations of the Americas (Todorov 1984; Thornton 1987). In 
the case of the U.S., the introduction of diseases to which the native population had no 
immunities, the destruction of Indian'ways of life, and warfare were responsible for what can only 
be described as  a demographic holocaust (Thornton 1987). Thornton estimated that from the early 
contact in the sixteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century the native population 
declined from over five million to around six hundred thousand (p. 90). 
Although American Indians resisted this onslaught on their land and communities 
(particularly in the nineteenth century) the encroachment onto their land and resources has 
continued for over three centuries. Despite some brief periods of apparently36 progressive White- 
Indian relations, the overarching pattern of pillage still prevails (Cornell 1988). Indians have 
always provided an economic developmental frontier for whites. Whereas in the past whites lusted 
for Indian land, today it is for the minerals, water, recreational space, and other resources found 
on the reservations. 
B) Chattel Slavery: 1660-1 865 
There is much debate about the character of white-Black relations in the seventeenth 
century. For some (Handlin and Handlin 1971; Breen 1976; Fredrickson 1981; Boles 1983), race 
relations a t  the time were fluid. In one Boles opinionYa~lacks and white indentured workers "ran 
away together, had sex together, in fact lived, worked, played, and died together with apparently 
little racial antipathy" (Boles 1983: 16). However, there is also evidence that these groups 
occupied distinct social positions in the colonies before 1660 (Frazier 1954; Jordan 1968; Meir and 
Rudwick 1970; Franklin 1974). One clear example of the different status of Blacks and poor 
whites in the colonies was the application of penalties to runaway servants. For instance, in 1640 
36 I am referring to Roosevelt's "Indian New Deal" and Nixonys "Self Determination" programs. 
For a critique of these programs see Vine Deloria, Custer Died for your Sins (London: The 
McMillan Company, 1969). 
37 On the twentieth century history of white attempts to control Indian resources see the 
following books. Native American Studies, Economic Development in American Indian Reservations. 
Native American Studies: University of New Mexico Development Series No. 1, 1979; Joseph G. 
Jorgensen (ed.), Native Americans and Energy Development II Boston: Anthropology Resource 
Center and Seventh Generation Fund, 1984); Marjane Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian 
Control of Energy Development (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1990); and Joseph G. 
Jorgensen, Oil Age Eskimos (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 
1990). 
the General Court of Virginia pronounced a sentence on three runaway servants: a Dutchman, a 
Scot, and a Black. The first two were ordered to serve one extra year of service to their masters 
but in the case of the third the Court pronounced that "being a negro named John Punch [he] 
shall serve his natural life here or else where" (Jordan 1968: 75). Nevertheless, as  Winthrop 
Jordan (1968) pointed out some time ago, the historical record on this early period is too scant to 
make any strong case about how Blacks and whites interacted. 
Yet what no historian contests is that after the 1660s "racial slavery" (Fredrickson 1981) 
crystallized as  an institution setting a definite racial pattern. Historian T. H. Breen, who 
supported the thesis of the common status of Blacks and whites in the early period, commented 
that: 
.... whites achieved a sense of race solidarity a t  the expense of blacks. Negroes 
were set apart a s  objects of contempt and ridicule. The whites, even the 
meanest among them, always knew there was a class of men permanently 
below them (Breen 1976: 134). 
Historian Gary B. Nash offers a similar view.;about the effects of racial slavery and the 
availability of an Indian frontier on forging racial unity across class lines among whites. 
By relocating their reservoir of servile labor from the impoverished rural 
villages of England and Ireland to the villages of West Africa, while a t  the 
same time turning internal class tensions into external violence against native 
occupiers of fertile land, late-seventeenth-century southern colonizers were able 
to forge a consensus among upper- and lower class whites. With new land 
available through dispossession of Indians, and the pipeline carrying new 
indentured servants shut down, lower-class southern whites became aspiring 
landowners, desirous of owning their own black bondsmen and bondwomen, and 
thus emerged a s  a stabilizing force in the eighteenth-century plantation society 
rather than a source of disequilibrium as in the seventeenth. Race became the 
primary badge of  status in a world that had relied primarily on religious and 
economic distinctions in creating lines of  social stratification (Nash 1986: 15-16; 
my emphasis). 
Although some analysts insist that racism was the cause of slavery (Jordan 1968; Degler 
1971), racial slavery was what transformed racial notions and disjointed racial practices into a highly 
structured and formalized system of social relations (Boles 1983; Allen 1994). Such an institution, 
which emanated out of the labor needs of the planter class (Williams 1961; Fredrickson 1981; 
Williams 1990), developed into a structuml feature of the social system. After a negative "social 
value" (Williams 1990) was attached to some groups (Indians and Blacks), race became another 
factor of vertical division in the social system. Those assigned the "unfree labor slot" in the 
plantation economy (Williams 1990) became degraded and, to use Orlando Patterson's notion 
(19821, "socially dead." Even accepting Eugene Genevese's (1974, 1979) description of slavery a s  
a "paternalistic" institution, the fact remains that  enslaved Africans were property and, a s  such, 
were sold, raped, beaten, used as collateral in loans, and o v e r ~ o r k e d . ~ ~  On this point, 
anthropologist Sydney Mintz ha& pointed out that  in societies like the U.S. where slavery coincided 
with capitalistic forms of social organization "a more complete dehumanization of the slaves" 
prevailed m n t z  1969: 33). 
The laws and regulations and the racial practices that  crystallized after 1660, by 
denigrating Blacks, "elevated the lowest white to a level above the most talented slave into a 
pseudo fraternity of white equals" (Boles 1983: 21). In fact, the institutionalization of racial 
slavery affected the nature of the inter-racial relations between whites and blacks regadless of the 
class status of  Blacks. For instance, the slave codes, in addition to specifving in a very detailed 
way the status of slaves, specified that  all Blacks regardless of their legal status (free or slave) 
had td submit themselves to the will of all White people (Goodsell 1969). 
Notwithstanding that  some analysts have virtually ignored class and legal status 
distinctions among-Blacks from 1619 to 1860 (notably, Wilson 1978), the evidence suggests that  
these distinctions were as  important then as they are  today in shaping the life chances of Blacks 
(Woodson 1922; Frazier 1957a; Litwack 1961; Berlin 1975; Sowell 1975; Brooks 1990). Yet, and 
this is the important point for .our purposes, all Blacks experienced the effects of mcialization 
despite their class position, their legal status (free or unfree), and their place of residence (North or 
South). Free Blacks, whether poor (as most were) or rich (as a few were), and whether they lived 
in the North or in the South, had to abide by the racial etiquette of the period and had restricted 
38 For an alternative interpretation on the paternalism of some masters, see Leslie Howard 
Owens, This Species of Property: S h e  Life and Culture in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). 
possibilities for social class mobility (Wade 1964; Berlin 1975). Ira Berlin noted that before 1790 
the proportion of free Blacks was small and the extent and intensity of the laws to regulate their 
lives was limited. However, a s  their proportion increased, they were more heavily regulated. The 
following description by Berlin exemplifies their plight. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the legal foundation of white 
control was set. Southern law presumed all Negroes to be slaves, and whites 
systematically barred free Negroes from any rights and symbols they equated 
with freedom. Whites legally prohibited Negro freemen from moving freely, 
participating in politics, testifying against whites, keeping guns, or lifting a 
hand to strike a white person .... In addition, they burdened free Negroes with 
special imposts, barred them from certain trades. and often tried and punished 
them like slaves. To enforce their prescriptive codes and constantly remind free 
Negroes of their lowly status, almost every state forced free Negroes to register 
and carry freedom papers, which had to be renewed periodically and might be 
inspected by any suspicious white (Berlin 1975: 316-317). 
Despite their internal stratification along class lines and the diversity of African peoples 
that were brought into the U.S. the fact-that all them experienced some form of racial oppression 
(Allen 1994) facilitated their consolidation into one racial group. Moreover, through their resistance 
(racial contestationj to the-iniquity of slavery and the constant degradation that all of them had to 
endure, Blacks were able u, develop their own culture, social institutions, and particular religious 
form (Rawick 1972; Owens 1974). As historian George P. Rawick noted some time ago: 
In a long social process the slaves developed an  independent community and 
culture which molded the slave personality. This social personality was kept 
whole by the day-to-day and night-to-night life of the slave quarters. While the 
struggles that the slaves engaged in were rarely epic, they were real and often 
successful in limited terms (Rawick 1972: 97). 
C )  Apartheid Toward Blacks: Race Relations from 1860 until the 1960s 
The racial structure developed until 1860 crumbled with the Civil War. Although 
rationalized as a fight against slavery, the War had more to do with the business of preserving the 
Union. President Lincoln, as most white northerners, believed that there was a "physical 
difference between the white and black races" and supported the notion of racial segregation 
(Gossett 1972). Moreover, his discussion about slavery was incidental to the matter of preserving 
the Union. As Abraham Lincoln clearly noted in a letter to Horace Greeley 1862: 
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to 
save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I 
would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all slaves, I would do it; and if I 
could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What 
I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save 
this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help 
to save the Union (As quoted in Ringer 1983: 183; emphasis in original). 
But what was the meaning of "saving the Union"? Historian Eric Foner suggested that 
Unionism was part of a larger Republican ideology which articulated a series of elements: 
"northern resentment of southern political power, devotion to the Union, anti-slavery based upon 
the free labor argument, moral revulsion to the peculiar institution, racial prejudice, a commitment 
to the northern social order and its development and expansion" (Foner 1970: 310). The 
substratum of this ideology was the defense of a particular path of socioeconomic development: 
"small-scale capitalism." In the words of Foner, "For the Republicans, enmity toward the South 
was intimately bound up with their loyalty to the society of small-scale capitalism which they 
:: perceived in the North" (p. 3 161. 
This interpretation does not give any credit to the agency of enslaved Africans in contesting 
5 .  
the institution of racial slavery. Slaves had resisted slavery in multiple ways since its 
establishment by running away, slowing the pace of production when unsupervised, destroying 
tools, self-mutilation, committing suicide, dividing the masters and the overseers, deceiving the 
masters, and by revolting even in unfavorable demographic and geographical conditions (Aptheker 
1943; Stampp 1956; Wood 1971; Rawick 1972; Owens 1976). According to Kenneth Stampp: 
Slave resistance, whether bold and persistent or mild and sporadic, created for 
all slaveholders a serious problem, of discipline. As authors or as readers they 
saw the problem discussed in numberless essays with such titles as "The 
Management of Negroes," essays which filled the pages of southern 
agricultural periodicals. Many masters had reason to agree with the owner of a 
hundred slaves who complained that he possessed "just 100 troubles," or with 
the North Carolina planter who said that slaves were "a troublesome property" 
(Stampp 1956: 30). 
As the Civil War unfolded, slaves' resistance increased exponentially. Furthermore, Blacks 
served in the Union Army in large numbers and were recognized even by President Lincoln as a 
vital ingredient in defeating the Confederate -army Oubois 1939; Boston 1988). The important 
role played by Blacks in the Civil War  was pointed out by W. E. B. Dubois in his Black Folk: 
In the revolution which ensued, the possible reaction of the slaves was ignored 
by all except the small party of abolitionists, with its contingent of free 
Negroes. In the end, however, this great mass of them remained on the 
plantations. They were from the first a source of great anxiety, and a 
considerable percentage of them a t  every opportunity ran away to the area 
occupied by Northern armies and became servants and laborers; eventually, to 
the number of 200,000, they became actual soldiers bearing arms (Dubois 
1939: 204). 
While southern white men went to war, surveillance decreased in plantations and all forms 
of "insubordination" increased. The fear of slave rebellion, a fear that had always been part of the 
southern "white mind" (Jordan 1968; Rawick 1972; Fredrickson 1973), was evident in the 
documents left behind by masters. As historian Leon Litwack noted: 
Deprived of what they deemed essential protection, often frustrated in their 
attempts to ant.icipate black behavior. many anguished whites forgot all that 
talk about contented and loyal slaves and described a situation fraught with the 
most terrifying implications. Having heard that the home guard might soon be 
recalled to combat the Yankee invaders, the mistress of a plantation in the 
Abbeville district of South Carolina wondered how the remaining whites could 
possibly survive the internal enemy. "If the men are going, then awful things 
are coming, and I don't want to stay. My God, the women and children, it will 
be murder and ruin. There are many among the black people and they only 
want-a chance." If anj7 additional evidence were needed, the obsession with 
internal security and, perhaps most ominous, the deployment in some regions 
of Confederate troops to resist both Yankee invaders and rebellious blacks 
suggested a white South desperately clinging to the fiction of the docile slave 
without in any way believing it (Litwack 1978: 30). 
With the abolition of slavery, the form as  well a s  the content of racial oppression changed 
and a new racial structure emerged. The new economic position assigned to Blacks and other 
racial minorities (Chicanos) became tenant farmers or, for the lucky ones, "nigger jobs" in the 
service and the industrial sectors (see Table 1 below!. Their "placement" in this labor niche was 
accomplished through vagrancy and apprenticeship laws, restrictions on the right of Blacks to buy 
land, and to work in certain occupations (Fredrickson 1981: 213). To "guarantee" the immobility 
of Blacks, other measures such a s  debt imprisonment and the infamous convict lease system were 
enacted. Thus, rather than a split labor-market (Bonacich 1980a), "most blacks in the South 
between 1865 and 1900 were not yet in a position to compete directly with whites for the same 
occupations" (p. 215). As tenants workers, they were "reduced to the status of a serf' (Woodson 
and Greene 1930: 25) and, as industrial workers, they were located a t  the bottom of the well with 
little chance for occupational mobility (Spero and Harris 1974: 32-33). 
Table 1 - Distribution of Blacks By Occupations, 1890 
Industry Number Per Cent 
Agriculture 1,728,325 
Domestic and Personal Service 956,754 
Manufacturing 208,374 
Trade and Transportation 145,717 
Professionals 33,994 
From Table 10 in Greene and Woodson, The Negm Wage Earner (19301, p. 37. 
The economic position of Blacks did not change much until well into the twentieth century 
(Sper'o and Harris 1974; Higgs 1977; Foner 1981; Marable 1983). It not until after WWI, which 
created a labor shortage in the industrial North, that many Blacks migrated from the South and 
joined the ranks of the working class Foner 1981). Yet, this transition from agricultural to 
industrial jobs did not break the Jim Crow pattern of employment. Spero and Harris (see also 
Woodson 1947) contend that although there was no wage discrimination39 between Blacks and 
whites in the North, Blacks earned less that whites because they were elbowed into low skill 
jobs.40 In their own words: 
39 The data on whether or not northern employers engaged in wage discrimination is not clear- 
cut. Although Abraham and Harris believed that it was not widespread, they reported some wage 
discrimination in several northern cities (p. 176-177). See also Herman Feldrnan, Racial Factors in 
American Industry (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1931). 
40 The role of the white working class in this process is nowadays accepted as a fact. On this 
point see Aronowitz (1973), Gould (1977), Foner (1981), Trotter (1985), Smith (1987), Grifith 
(1988), Roediger (1992), and Hill (1993). 
The jobs into which the Negroes went were usually those which native 
Americans and Americanized foreign-born white labor did not want. This 
largely accounts for the almost spectacular increase in the proportion of 
Negroes in the iron and steel foundaries where the work is dirty, hot, and 
unpleasant (Spero and Harris 1974: 155-156). 
In the South, where rapid industrialization started in the 1880s (Reich 1981), the 
traditional distinction between white and Black jobs persisted with good jobs monopolized by 
whites and bad jobs by Blacks. In addition, whenever whites and Blacks worked in similar jobs, 
Whites received wages that were in average fifty to twenty percent higher (see Abraham and 
Harris 1974: 169-174). 
At the social level, the rules of the new racial order emerged slowly given that the War 
and the period of R.econstruction (1865-1877) shook the rules of racial engagement and challenged 
the place of Blacks in society (Woodward 1966; Fredrickson 1981). The transition from slavery to 
apartheid (Jim Crow) was characterized by inconsistency and no generally accepted code of racial 
mores (Woodward 1966). Slavery did not require either a very sophisticated and specific set of 
rules to preserve "social distance" or an elaborate racial ideology (racism) because of the thorough 
differences of status among the races (Fredrickson 1981). But as  Blacks became free they posed a 
threat to white supremacy. Slowly, but in a definite manner, segregationist laws and practices 
emerged after 1865 and were solidified by the 1880s with the enactment of Jim Crow laws all 
over the South. These laws involved the disenfranchisement of Blacks, racial separation in public 
accommodations, segregation in housing and in schools, the workplace, and in other areas to 
insure white supremacy. C. Vann Woodward describes the extent of these laws in the following 
manner: 
The extremes to which caste penalties and separation were carried in parts of 
the South could hardly find a counterpart short of the latitudes of India and 
South Africa .... curfew..separate phone booths .... separate books and storage of 
books in public schools..South Carolina separated the mulatto caste..separation 
of prostitutes, and even "Ray Stannard Baker found Jim Crow Bibles for Negro 
witnesses in Atlanta and Jim Crow elevators for Negro passengers in Atlanta 
buildings" (Woodward 1966: 102). 
As in the previous period, racialization affected all Blacks despite their class position. As C. 
Vann Woodward noted, "the Jim Crow laws applied to all Negroes -- not merely to the rowdy, or 
drunken, or surly, or ignorant ones," reinforcing the racial aspect of their location in the social 
system (p. 107; see also Myrdal 1944). At the same time, the Jim Crow laws placed the authority 
for enforcement on "common whites." This ingredient reinforced the racialization of whites in the 
system because it implied that all of them had some real power over all nonwhites. In this second 
period of race relations, racialization allowed for the lowest White to count more than the highest 
negro in civil, social, and legal matters. And, as  in the previous period, this superior standing 
applied even when a "respectable" Black was involved. 
The racialized character of the social system, although all-inclusive and systemic as  in the 
previous period, represented progress vis-a-vis the system shaped by chattel slavery. First and 
foremost, Blacks ceased to be viewed as  property. Although this was also the period of heightened 
+. 
"scientific" discourse on Black inferiority, the apologists for the system did not advocate the re- 
B 
=..- enslavement of Blacks. Second, the period of Reconstruction (1867-1877) established numerous 
civil, social, and political rights that later served as  ammunition to contest the racial standing of 
+" Blacks socially and politically. Third, segregation created the foundation for developing an ethnic a- 
enclave in which   lacks who had acquired a higher class position and/or some skills during the 
p 
slave period could flourish by monopolizing the Black market (Marable 1983). Given that this 
sector could not "move up" a s  it wished in society, it provided some vital resources (monetary and 
otherwise) to mount an effective challenge to the segregationist order. Finally, segregation had the 
unintended consequence of strengthening the social basis of the Black experience and, thus, 
created the necessary conditions for its own demise (Morris 1984). Blacks were able to develop 
and strengthen their own social institutions (e.g, Black church, Black colleges, etc.) and their own 
communal spirit. 
D) Racialization Since the 1960s: The Emergence of the 'New Racism' 
The segregation of Blacks was predicated on 1) keeping them in rural areas, mostly in the 
South, 2) maintaining them as agricultural workers, and 3) excluding them from the political 
process. However, as Blacks successfully challenged their socioeconomic position by migrating 
initially from rural areas to urban areas in the South and later to the North (Henri 1975; 
Harrison 1991), by pushing themselves by whatever means necessary into non-agricultural 
occupations (Tuttle 1970; Foner 1981), and by developing political organizations and movements 
like Garveyism, the NAACP, CORE, the National Urban League, the Southern Regional Council, 
and the CIC W700dward 19661, the foundations of Apartheid began to crack. Other factors leading 
to the abolition of the segregationist order were the participation of Blacks in World Wars I and 11, 
which patently underscored the contradiction between fighting for freedom abroad and lacking it a t  
home (Wynn 1993); the Cold War, which made it a necessity to eliminate overt discrimination at 
home in order to sell the U.S. a s  the champion of democracy; and a number of judicial decisions, 
legislative acts, and presidential decrees that transpired since the late thirties (Woodward 
1966) .~ l  
All these factors and the actions by Blacks made change possible. But ripe conditions are 
not enough to change any structural order. Hence, the racial order had to be directly challenged if 
it was going to be effectively transformed. That was the role fulfilled by the Civil Rights 
movement and the other forms of mass protest (so-called race riots) by Blacks that took place in 
the sixties and seventies. Organized .and spontaneous challenges were the catalysts that brought 
down overt segregation.42 
41 There is a well known thesis which connects industrialization andlor modernization with the 
elimination --or a t  least, the attenuation-- of racist practices. In recent times, William Julius 
Wilson's work (1978; 1987) has resuscitated that thesis. However, such arguments are predicated 
on a conception of "capitalists" --and capitalism-- as rational subjects purely oriented by profit- 
making. For more nuanced historical accounts of the role of monopoly capital in the transition 
from Jim Crow to the contemporary racial structure, see David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans 
in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1987) and Melvin E. 
Leiman, Political Economy of Racism (London: Pluto Press, 1993). 
42 The discussion of the Civil Rights movement is beyond the scope of this paper. For some 
interpretations of the movement, see Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement 
(New York: Free Press, 1984); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's 
Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Doug McAdam, 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1982); and Jack Bloom, Class Race and the Civil Rights Movement (Bloomington, 
Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987). On the importance of riots in effecting social change in this 
period, see James W. Button, Blacks and Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in 
Southern Communities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
The major changes brought by the Civil Rights movement were at the political level. 
Blacks, particularly southern Blacks, gained formal political rights (Piven and Cloward 1979; Omi 
. . 
and Winant 1986). In addition, the proscription through legislative and judicial means of overt 
forms of racial segregation and discrimination, created a new social space for Blacks and other 
minorities in the United States. Again, as in the previous period, structural changes led to 
significant changes in the form of racial oppression. Many analysts (Caditz 1976; Wellman 1977; 
Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Pettigrew 1994) have noted that "racism" (as usually 
defined) and race relations have acquired a new character since the sixties. They have pointed to 
the increasingly covert nature of racial discourse and racial practices; the avoidance of racial 
terminology and even the existence of racism as a social problem by whites (Lamont 1992); and 
the elaboration of a racial agenda over political matters (state intervention, individual rights, 
responsibility, etc.) that eschews any direct racial reference.43 What follows is a tentative outline 
of the emerging racial structure that I have termed the "New Racism." 
1) The racial ideology has been rearticulated over the issue of "reverse racism." The new 
racial ideology exhibited by whites incorporates the principle of racial equality but, a t  the same 
time, opposes and classifies as  "racist" policies to achieve it (Omi and Winant 1986; Winant 
1994). Moreover, racial ideology has become more sophisticated and slippery and tends to exclude 
the overtly racist language and expressions of previous periods. Yet even though contemporary 
racial discourse avoids direct "racist" references it is still shaped by racial notions.44 
43 The contemporary subtle and yet pervasive character of the U.S. racial structure seems not to 
be unique. Others have reported similar patterns in England and other European countries. For 
European examples see M. Barker, The New Racism (London: Junction Books, 1981); .and, more 
recently, Ettienne Balibar and Irnmanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities 
(New York: Verso, 1991). 
44 There is a significant debate among social psychologists about whether or nor there is a new 
set of racial attitudes operating in American society. Although the proponents of this view 
(McConahay and Hough 1976; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988) have slightly different 
conceptions about the content and meaning of the new racial attitudes, they basically agree that it 
includes a "subtler cluster of racial attitudes consisting of a combination of anti-Black and 
traditional American values" (Sidanaus, Deveraux, and Pratto 1991). Opposing these view is a 
cluster of authors who argue .that we still have the "old racismn (Weigel and Howes 1985; 
Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) and that the "new racism" proponents 
2) Despite the much heralded growth of the Black middle class there is still an 
unquestionable racialized aspect to the class experience of all Blacks, as  well a s  other racial 
minorities, in the United States. In the case of the middle class, they experience their middle class 
life differently than their white counterparts in terms of income, housing, quality of education, type 
of job, job satisfaction, etc. (Landry 1987; Boston 1988; Brooks 1990; Benjamin 1991). Racial 
minorities are overrepresented in the lower tiers of the occupational structure and among the 
unemployed (Blackwell 1991; Hacker 1992; Pinckney 1993). Despite their increase in white collar 
occupations (Farley 1984; Farley and Allen 1987), they are overrepresented in the lower echelons 
of white collar jobs and are highly overrepresented in the state sector, a sector that has been 
targeted for significant cuts since the late seventies (Pinckney 1984; Landry 1987). Also, in all 
occupations, most minorities earn less than whites despite their educational background (Newman 
et al. 1978; Hacker 1992; Goldsmith and Blakely 1992; Williams 1993) and some even argue that 
there is still a racial wage gap (Boston 1988). 
Those,minority groups that do not fit this pattern (Korean Americans. Asian Indlans, 
Japanese Americans, etc.) grew extraordinarily through recent immigration, an immigration with 
a high proportion of professionals, making their case an exceptional one. However, even these 
relatively privileged immigrants suffer from the racial organization of America as t$ey are 
systematically denied higher-level jobs, are forced into the small-business niche, and are attacked 
by whites for their success (Takaki 1989; Chan 1991; Tagaki 1993). 
3) A new web of informal segregationist and exclusionary practices consistent with the 
general covert character of the "New Racism" seems to be replacing the old formal practices. Such 
informal practices have been documented in terms of housing (Massey and Denton 19931, 
employers' hiring preferences (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1994), internal labor markets in 
factories (Williams 1987), access to loans and insurance policies (Squires and Velez 19871, and 
are conflating opposition to government intervention (a political matter) with racial matters (Bobo 
1988; Jackman and'Muha 1984; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Those who oppose the "new 
racism" argument seem to hold a purely ideological notion about American traditional values (e.g., 
Sniderman and Piazza 1993), conceive racial ideology as  static, and do not envisage how racist 
thinking can be rearticulated and fused with what they define as "political" attitudes. 
even in restaurants (Schurnan et al. 1983). Although many of these practices are "invisible" to 
whites, most minorities identify the subtle and yet pervasive character of these practices in their 
everyday life (Close 1993; Feagin 1994). 
4) Politically, minorities seem to be incorporated in symbolic fashion, that is, only certain 
types of minorities are selected for positions of power in the social system (e.g., Andrew Young, 
Clarence Thomas, and the like). Both the &publican and the Democratic parties incorporate de- 
racialized (whitened) and de-radicalized minorities in positions of power (Marable 1980 and 1983). 
Although the urbanization of racial minorities (Blacks in particular) allowed for their election to 
mayoral positions in large cities, they inherited cities in decline and were forced to recant their 
radicalism and pursue "pro-growth strategies" that benefit mostly white corporate America 
(Jennings 1992). Black mayors face a hostile white environment a t  the local, state, and federal 
level which limits their chances for success (Catlin 1993). 
Another element of the current political situation faced by racial minorities is that the 
particular problems afflicting its poorest segments, the group that sociologists have labeled as the 
"underclass" (Glasgow 1980; Marable 1983; Wilson 1978 1987), seem to be beyond the reach of 
institutional politics. Of course, at  no time in history have racial minorities attained any 
significant change in the U.S. racial structure through the traditional channels alone (Hamilton 
1973). The difference today is that the option of mass protest is not being seriousiy contemplated 
by most minority leaders (Marable 1980). As political scientist Robert C. Smith has noted: 
One of the problems in the organization of black insurgency today, however, 
compared to the Civil Rights era, is that black leadership and would-be-leaders 
are so thoroughly integrated into institutional structures and process that they 
may be removed both physically and psychologically from the mass base of the 
community .... Most black leaders know that the conditions of the black 
underclass cannot be effectively addressed without changes in the structure of 
the national economy. Yet they act a s  if fundamental changes can come about 
as a result of playing the routine power games of Washington or city politics 
when clearly such changes, if possible, are only possible as a result of mass 
mobilization inside the black community (Smith 1992: 119). 
5) Among the structural features employed for controlling racial minorities and keeping 
them "in their place" are police brutality, unequal arrest rates and sentencing, and the 
surveillance and imprisonment of radicals and, sporadically, of even moderate leaders (Marable 
1983, 1991). Moreover, given the hyper-segregation of minorities in urban areas (Massey and 
Denton 1993), a new strategy of monitoring entire minority communities seems to be emerging 
(Durnrn 1993; Davis 1993). 
Figure 3 depicts the primary racial coordinates of the U.S. racial structure a t  the 
economic, political, social, and ideological levels during the periods of conquestJslavery, apartheid, 
and New Racism. 
V. Conclusion 
The central argument advanced in this paper is that racism (as defined by mainstream 
social scientists) does not provide the tools for adequately understanding racial phenomena. I 
suggest that until a structural framework is developed, analysts will be entangled in ideological 
views of racism that are ungrounded. Lacking a structural view, racial phenomena will be reduced 
to a derivation of the class structure (as Marxists interpreters do) or will be viewed as  the result 
of an irrational ideology (as mainstream social scientists believe). Although others have pointed to 
the need for a structural understanding of race (authors associated with the institutionalist, the 
internal colonial, and the racial formation perspectives), they have failed u, provide the analytical 
categories to move beyond their critique of mainstream views on racism. 
The alternative framework elaborated here suggests that racism should be studied from 
the point of view of racialization. The essence of my theorization is the contention that after a 
society becomes raciaiized, racialization develops a life of its own.45 Although racialization 
interacts with class and gender structurations in the social system, it becomes in and of itself an 
organizing principle of social relations (Omi and W-inant 1986; Essed 1991). Race, as most 
analysts suggest, is a social construct but that construct, as  in the case of class and gender, has 
45 Historian Eugene Genovese (1971) made a similar argument years ago. However, he regarded 
racism as a n  ideology albeit one that once it "arises it alters profoundly the material reality and in 
fact becomes a partially autonomous feature of that reality" (Genovese 1971: 340). 
Figure 3 - Main Features of U.S. Racial Structure, 17th to 20th Century 
Slavery Apartheid New Racism 
Economic 
-Slaves -Sharecropping (1860s-1910s) -Mostly in the lower tiers of 
-Free blacks systematically -Exclusion from top jobs the occupational structure 
received the worst deal -"Nigger Jobs" (1920s- 1960s) and experience 
-Occupational sedimentation 
Political 
-Almost total exclusion -Symbolic integration 
-Deracialization of nonwhite 
politicians 
Social 
-Almost complete social -Rigid racial separation -Covert racial practices 
degradation of nonwhites *Housing covenants *Meritocracy 
-No need for rigid racial *Laws against inter-marriage *Limited integration 
separation *Separate and unequal *Worst schools and 
tracking 
Ideological 
-Simple ideology -Elaborate ideology -Sophisticated ideology 
No need for a highly developed Need for an ideology to Ideology in accordance 
ideology because of the thorough orderlexplain the "place" of with new covert practices. 
character of racial domination. nonwhites in society. The new ideology revolves 
around the issue of "reverse 
racism" ('they' are taking 
'our' jobs) and "equal 
opportunity" (why should 
'they' have any advantages 
over 'us'). 
independent pertinent effects in social life. After racial stratification is brought about, race 
becomes an independent form of vertical hierarchy in society. This means that races experience 
positions of subordination and superordination in society and, thus, develop different interests. 
It is argued that although not all members of the dominant race receive phenomenal 
advantages, all of them receive advantages and are in a superior strategic position compared to 
members of the subordinated race who are in the same class and gender locations. This 
differential social status of the races changes through the "normal" dynamics of the social system 
given that all aspects of the system are racialized. However, at times, the social dynamics acquire 
a distinct racial character. This process is defined as  racial contestation or the struggle to maintain 
and/or change the position of one's race in the system. The changing character of racialization and 
of the historical conception of what race is, produces different forms of racial oppression and of 
racial ideology (racism). 
The framework developed here is not a theoretical panacea to explain racial phenomena in 
societies. It  is intended to trigger a serious discussion on how race structures social systems. 
Moreover, the serious matter of how race interacts and intersects with class and gender still has 
not been satisfactorily addressed. Provisionally, I argue that a non-functionalist reading of the 
concept of social system may give us the clue of how to comprehend societies "structured in 
dominance" (Hall 1980). If societies are viewed as systems that articulate different structures 
(organizing principles upon which sets of social relations are systematically patterned after), then 
it is possible to claim that race --as well a s  gender-- have distinctive as well a s  combined effects in 
society. To test the usefulness of this theorization, it is necessary to develop comparative work on 
racialization in other social formations. Then and only then can the usefulness of the categories 
introduced in this paper be adequately assessed. 
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